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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen the emergence of pragmatism as a central focus
of legal theory.1 Although pragmatism is an elusive term at best, part of its
attraction may lie in its potential to provide a moderate response to two
strands of contemporary legal theory: the indeterminacy critique and the
critique of grand theory. The indeterminacy critique, associated with the
critical legal studies school, has carried on the legal realists' attack on for-
malism.2 One reaction to this critique has been the effort to formulate a
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami. A.B., Harvard College, 1976; J.D.,
Harvard Law School, 1981. I am grateful to David Abraham, Tony Alfieri, Wes Daniels, Marc
Fajer, Michael Fischl, Pat Gudridge, Lisa Iglesias, Jenni JafI, Jim Kainen, Lili Levi, Martha Maho-
ney, Jeremy Paul, Rob Rosen, and Steve Winter for their comments and criticisms. I owe particular
appreciation to Peggy Radin for the inspiration of her work and the generousness of her response to
my critique. Tucker Ronzetti served as a perceptive critic and research assistant in the early stages
of the project, and Alberto Zapata and Adam Moskowitz provided excellent research assistance in
its later stages.
1. See, ag., Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409 (1990); Sympo-
sium on the Renaissance ofPragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1569 (1990).
2. For examples of the indeterminacy critique, see MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIEs 45-51 (1987); James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local
Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 685 (1985); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73
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middle ground, acknowledging the critique of formalism while still main-
taining some sense of the separation of law and politics upon which the lib-
eral notion of the rule of law depends. Pragmatism may seem to occupy that
middle ground insofar as it implies a recognition that legal rules are "contin-
gent not just upon the acts of legislatures or other authoritative entities, but
also upon the surrounding social context, the content of an entire form of
lffe." 3
The second strand questions the proper scope of legal theory; significant
elements of the legal academy increasingly have turned away from grand
theorizing in any form, focusing instead on context, experience, and plural-
ity. For example, important currents of feminist thought reject grand theo-
ries and instead emphasize the role of narrative and the concrete. 4 Critical
race theorists join this critique by emphasizing the perspective and experi-
ence of the oppressed.5 The turn to pragmatism in legal theory accords well
with this shift; though used in different ways by different theorists, "pragma-
tism" suggests, if nothing else, a focus on context and practice, as well as a
drawing back from grand theory.6
Margaret Jane Radin's work on property and personhood represents a
fruitful encounter between these two diverse trends. In two important re-
spects her theory constitutes a continuing effort to develop a self-consciously
pragmatic understanding of the law.7 First, Radin's efforts appear to be mo-
CAL. L. REv. 1151 (1985); Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards. Nihilism and Legal
Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984). Of course, one cannot give any single characterization of the critical
legal studies movement. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 785
(1990) (self-consciously applying a critical legal studies approach while disclaiming interest in "the
indeterminacy of legal rules").
3. Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REv. 781, 808 (1989)
[hereinafter Radin, Rule ofLaw]; see also Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property:
Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 CoLuM. L. REv. 1667, 1680 (1988) [hereinafter
Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property] ("Pragmatism is essentially particularist, essentially con-
text-bound and holistic; each decision is an all-things-considered intuitive weighing. Pragmatism is
indeed 'essentially' ad hoc.").
4. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971 (1991); Martha
L. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing Differences: The Future of Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42
FLA. L. Rv. 25, 28-30 (1990); Mar J. Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of
Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16 N.M. L. REv. 613, 618-21
(1986); Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373,
1376 -80 (1986); cf Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together?: Storytelling, Gender-
Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 511 (1992)
(feminist analysis of gay rights and narrative). For a more positive evaluation of the role of "grand
theory" in feminist theorizing, see Frances Olsen, Feminist Theory in Grand Style, 89 COLUM. L.
Rn'v. 1147, 1169-74 (1989) (reviewing CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: Dis-
couRsEs ON LIFE AND LAW (1987)).
5. See, e.g., Kimberl6 Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Law and
Politics, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 195 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed.
1990); Richard Delgado, When a Story is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REv. 95
(1990); Mar J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rlv. 323 (1987).
6. See Margaret Jane Radin, Diagnosing the Takings Problem, in COMPENSATORY JUSTICE:
NoMos XXXIII, at 248, 270 (John W. Chapman ed., 1991) [hereinafter Radin, Takings] (referring
to "the pragmatic practice of situated judgment in light of both partial principles and the unique
particularities of each case").
7. Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property, supra note 3, at 1680 (supporting "a pragmatic
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tivated by a desire to explore the limits of rule-like notions of law without
fully embracing the erasure of the separation of law and politics. 8 Second,
Radin appears to be motivated by a concern that grand, sweeping theories
may blind us to the actual significance and impact of legal rules that are
imposed in a "nonideal" world marked by poverty, racism, and sexism.9
Thus, Radin's theory of property and personhood makes a valuable contri-
bution both to the search for a middle ground between formalism and inde-
terminacy and to the emerging focus on context and plurality.
Radin's work has rightly been influential and widely cited in a variety of
contexts.10 Her project is all the more interesting because of the context in
which she has pursued it: a critique of law and economics theory for its
approach to decision making"); Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1699 (1990) [hereinafter Radin, Pragmatist]; Margaret Jane Radin & Frank Michelman,
Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal Practice 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1019 (1991) [hereinafter
Radin & Michelman, Critical Legal Practice]; see also Radin, Rule of Law, supra note 3, at 801, 812-
17 (describing pragmatism as concerned with the practice of communities).
8. Thus, Radin has argued:
[WMe must relinquish the traditional form of the ideal of the Rule of Law, without thinking
that the only alternative is arbitrary political power. We must relinquish the formalist
equation and the notion that judges and lawyers merely passively apply all-inclusive pre-
existing rules, without thinking that the only alternative is unchecked personal discretion.
Margaret Jane Radin, "After the Final No There Comes a Yes" A Law TeacherIs Report, 2 YALE J.L.
& HuMiAN. 253, 263 (1990) (footnote omitted).
9. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. Rav. 1849, 1915 (1987)
[hereinafter Radin, Market-Inalienability] ("[W]e are situated in a nonideal world of ignorance,
greed, and violence; of poverty, racism, and sexism. In spite of our ideals, justice under nonideal
circumstances, pragmatic justice, consists in choosing the best alternative now available to us."); cf
Margaret Jane Radin, Justice and the Market Domain, in MARKETS AND JUSTICE: NoMos XXXI,
at 165, 186 (John W. Chapman & J. Roland Pennock eds., 1989) [hereinafter Radin, Market Do-
main] (referring to "non-ideal or second-best (or perhaps just practical) justice").
10. The distinction that Radin draws between personal and fungible property has been applied
in many different contexts. Seee g., Silverman v. Barry, 845 F.2d 1072, 1081 (D.C. Cir.) (condo-
minium conversions), cer, denied, 488 U.S. 956 (1988); David L. Rosendorf, Comment, Homeless-
ness and the Uses of Theory: An Analysis of Economic and Personality Theories of Property in the
Context of Voting Rights and Squatting Rights 45 U. MIAMI L. Rv. 701, 709 (1990-1991) (home-
lessness); Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance: The Case of Public
Housing, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 878, 934 & n.234 (1990) (public housing); Joseph William Singer,
The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REv. 611, 661-62 (1988) (plant closings). Radin's
analysis of commodification and market-inalienability has been widely cited in the context of surro-
gacy. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 439-40, 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (1988); Elizabeth S.
Anderson, Is Women's Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AsF. 71, 71 & n.1 (1990); Joan
Mahoney, An Essay on Surrogacy and Feminist Thought, 16 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 81, 82
n.9, 83 n.21 (1988). It has been cited in a variety of other contexts as well. See, e.g., George M.
Armstrong, Jr., The Reification of Celebrity: Persona as Property, 51 LA. L. REv. 443, 450 n.39, 451
& n.45 (1991) (celebrity persona); Jody Freeman, The Feminist Debate Over Prostitution Reform:
Prostitutes'Rights Groups, Radical Feminists, and the (Im)possibility of Consent, 5 BERKELEY WO-
MEN'S LJ. 75, 101-04 (1989-1990) (prostitution); Karen Gross, The Debtor as Modern Day Peon: A
Problem of Unconstitutional Conditions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 165, 185 n.133, 197 n.219, 201
n.246 (1990) (bankruptcy law); Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Note, Personalizing Personalty: Toward a
Property Right in Human Bodies, 69 TEx. L. REv. 209, 214-19 (1990) (human body); see also JOHN
FRIEDMANN, EMPOWERMENT: THE POLITICS OF ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT 11-12 (1992) (in-
voking "human flourishing" as a guide to development theory).
Radin's analysis of "double binds" has also been taken up by other commentators. See, e.g.,
Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules" Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller
Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REv. 361, 395-96 & n.60 (1991) (implied warranties); Andrew Koppel-
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inappropriate use of "market rhetoric."11 Economic analysis of the law
ironically shares with the indeterminacy critique a complete rejection of
legal formalism and of any distinctive rule-like character of law. It relies on
economic analysis, not legal reasoning, as the sole determinant of legal out-
comes. 12 Moreover, the law and economics school seeks to explain and issue
prescriptions for virtually every area of the law; it might seem to embrace
sweeping theory on a grand scale. Practitioners of law and economics ac-
knowledge no apparent limit to the domain of their analysis, tackling diverse
areas of personal and social life like adoption, 13 prostitution, 14 and religious
freedom.15
Radin presents a comprehensive alternative to law and economics the-
ory. As we embody ourselves in the world around us, she argues, some
property, which she calls "personal," becomes essential to our personhood.
Other property is "fungible," and can be bought and sold without harm to
personhood. 16 To distinguish between these two forms of property, Radin
man, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense ofAbortion, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 480, 502 & n.
97 (1990) (abortion rights).
Finally, Radin's writings have been cited or included in property law textbooks. See, eg.,
RICHARD H. CHUSED, CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS IN PROPERTY 84-89 (1988); JESSE
DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 137 (2d ed. 1988); CHARLES M. HAAR & LANCE
LIEBMAN, PROPERTY AND LAW 63-64 (2d ed. 1985).
11. For other critiques of market rhetoric, see KELMAN, supra note 2, at 114-85; Jeffrey L.
Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits of Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 1309 (1986); Frank I. Michelnan, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in ETHICS,
ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW: NoMos XXIV, at 3 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds.,
1982).
12. As Richard Posner has written:
The ultimate test of a rule derived from economic theory is not the elegance or logicality of
the derivation but the rule's effect on social wealth. The extension of the rule of capture to
oil and gas was subjected to such a test, flunked, and was replaced... by efficient rules.
The other rules of the common law can and should be tested likewise.
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 362 (1990); see also id. at 454 ("Mhe
essence of formalism is to conceive of law as a system of relations among ideas rather than as a social
practice.").
To be sure, economic analysis could be characterized as formal: It is built on a model of analyt-
ical rules with little concern for reality. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS
SITUATION AND ITS TASK 127 (1987) (noting the tendency of mainstream economists to conceive of
their discipline exclusively as "an analytical apparatus," resulting in "formal virtuosity" but "sub-
stantive sterility"). Nevertheless, economic analysis, unlike legal formalism, denies that there is a
distinctively legal mode of reasoning. See, e.g., POSNER, supra, at 459 ("iTlhere is no such thing as
'legal reasoning."').
13. See Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 323, 347 (1978); cf GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981) (analyz-
ing family relations, including marriage and child-rearing, in terms of market relations).
14. See HELEN REYNOLDS, THE ECONOMICS OF PROSTITUTION (1986).
15. See Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of
Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1989); cf Corry Azzi & Ronald Ehrenberg, Household
Allocation of Time and Church Attendance, 83 J. POL. EcON. 27 (1975) (analyzing church attend-
ance as trade-off between opportunity cost of time and "afterlife benefits").
16. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 959-60, 986-87
(1982) [hereinafter Radin, Personhood]. Radin suggests that "consensus must be a sufficient source
of objective moral criteria" to distinguish personal from fungible property. Id at 969; see also Ra-
din, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1908 ("There is no algorithm or abstract formula to tell
us which items are (justifiably) personal. A moral judgment is required in each case.").
[Vol. 45:347
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appeals to a normative vision of human flourishing. This vision is in a sense
pragmatically conceived, drawing on particular values that are said to be
shared or are implicit in our society, rather than on some transcendent, ab-
stract theory of what is right. 17 The distinction between the two types of
property matters, Radin argues, because we generally should accord per-
sonal property greater protection than fungible property.18 We may even
want to prevent personal property or personal attributes from being treated
as fungible goods by making them "market-inalienable"-that is, by forbid-
ding their purchase and sale.19
There is much to be said for Radin's project, both in its critical and con-
structive aims. Her work bolsters a number of progressive reforms, such as
rent control statutes, against the onslaught of conservative law and econom-
ics critiques. 20 Her analysis of commodification points out the harm created
by the relentless application of market rhetoric to all areas of social and
personal life.2 1 More generally, Radin's work suggests that a relatively de-
terminate meaning can be attached to rules by careful examination of the
social practices that form their context. This suggestion forms a thoughtful
response to the indeterminacy critique, which, taken to extremes, implies the
insufficiency of language for any communication.22 By grounding the possi-
bility of meaning in actual social life, Radin raises the possibility of a theory
of rules and language that avoids that absurd result without calling upon
formalist conceptions. She consciously aims to construct a progressive the-
ory that overcomes the distinction between subject and object,23 and bridges
17. For example, Radin asserts our society currently values embodiment in the home. Radin,
Personhood, supra note 16, at 987 ("There is both a positive sense that people are bound up with
their homes and a normative sense that this is not fetishistic."); Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra
note 9, at 1908; Radin, Takings, supra note 6, at 257, 259. However, she does not claim that such
embodiment represents some universal, timeless value.
18. Radin, Personhood, supra note 16, at 986 ("The more closely connected with personhood,
the stronger the entitlement" to protection of the property right.); Radin, Takings, supra note 6, at
259-60 (suggesting that personal property should have greater protection against eminent domain
than does fungible property).
19. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1850 ("Something that is market-inalienable
is not to be sold, which in our economic system means it is not to be traded in the market.").
Examples would include the prohibition of selling one's baby or organs.
20. Radin argues that residential tenants have a different and more "personal" kind of interest
in the apartments in which they live than does a landlord who views the apartment building primar-
ily as a "fungible" investment. Radin, Personhood, supra note 16, at 960, 992-96; Radin, Market-
Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1878; Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. &
PuB. A . 350, 360 (1986) [hereinafter Radin, Rent Control].
21. See Radin, Market Domain, supra note 9, at 190 ("[fIn some cases market rhetoric itself
can be viewed as an act injurious to personhood."); Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at
1885 ("[Universal market rhetoric does violence to our conception of human flourishing."); id at
1859-70, 1877-87.
22. Cf Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphorical Reasoning, and the Cognitive
Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. Rv. 1105, 1110-11 (1989) ("Part of what is troubling about the
subjectivist approach to law is that it assumes that we have more trouble communicating than we
actually do.").
23. See Radin, Rent Control, supra note 20, at 363 (her theory of personhood "blurs or bridges
the subject/object dichotomy"); Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1909 ("I am sug-
gesting that we relinquish the subject/object dichotomy and rely instead on our best moral judgment
in light of the best conception of personhood as we now understand it.").
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the gap between revolutionary transformation and preservation of the status
quo.
2 4
While Radin's project is worthy, her work is bound to fall prey to an
implicit conservative bias if carried out in its present form.25 The ramifica-
tions of this criticism extend well beyond Radin's own attempt to develop a
theory of property and personhood. For Radin's work reveals a characteris-
tic common to much contemporary legal theorizing: a politics informed by
an instinct for consensus and an aversion to conflict. A critique of her work
will therefore have broad significance, constructive as well as critical.2 6
A primary problem with Radin's analysis is that it both hides and glori-
fies power. Running throughout Radin's analysis is a treatment of power
that at once hides it and glorifies it. In one sense, Radin's methodology
keeps power hidden from view by appealing to social consensus as a source
of normative guidance for the law. This appeal permits legal issues to be
bracketed or separated out from deeply controversial disputes about what
people are and should be like. The appeal to consensus-not to some gen-
eral, overarching consensus, but to particular instances of values currently
shared-is explicit in her early work, and carries over into her conception
both of "human flourishing" and of the rule of law.27 Although Radin rec-
ognizes the existence of conflict and disagreement in society, she assumes
that legal practices can only be relatively determinate or rule-like if they are
grounded upon deep social consensus: "Some practices are so deeply ac-
cepted that they seem like immutable rules."'28
It is the very attempt to appeal to consensus, however, that I question.
After setting out a more detailed account of Radin's work in Part II, I will
24. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1875-77 (comparing "evolutionary" and
"revolutionary" approaches to noncommodification).
25. Before any criticism is offered, it is legitimate to ask whether a variety of works written
over a period of more than a decade can fairly be analyzed as a whole, particularly when they have
not been consciously offered as part of a single, ongoing project. In Radin's case, I believe that they
can. My critique does not suggest that her work is internally inconsistent-a charge that would be
vulnerable to the simple reply that Radin's thought has evolved over time. Rather, my critique
shows that Radin's work on property and commodification is informed, with a relatively high degree
of constancy, by conceptions of the nature of law and legal argument that she shares with most of
the legal academy.
26. Thus, I undertake the critique in roughly the same spirit as that which informs Unger's
critique of modern social theory. See UNGER, supra note 12, at 143 (arguing that because "no hard-
and-fast distinction separates criticism and construction," the "disintegration of the available tradi-
tions of social thought is no mere entropic process: the disintegrating traditions have forged many of
the instruments required for their transformation"). To criticize Radin's work is to think about how
legal theory might be recast.
27. But see Margaret Jane Radin, Lacking a Transformative Social Theory: A Response, 45
STAN. L. REv. 409, 415 n.25 (noting that Radin has "deliberately not used the word 'consensus'
since 1982). The particular judgment that Radin makes about embodiment in the home, for exam-
ple, seems to be the same in substance and character whether offered as an example of consensus or
of an ideal of human flourishing. Compare Radin, Personhood, supra note 16, at 969, 987 (noting
social consensus that "people are bound up with their homes and.., that this is not fetishistic") with
Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1908 ("What makes identifying oneself with some-
thing justifiable.., is an appropriate connection to our conception of human flourishing.... An
example of a justifiable kind of relationship is people's involvement with their homes.").
28. Radin, Rule of Law, supra note 3, at 819.
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argue in Part III that the law can never simply implement some consensus
regarding property and personhood. The social constitution of personhood
is always at stake when issues of property and commodification are decided.
A theory that brackets moral issues from legal ones overlooks the manner in
which exercises of power help shape the consensual norm that is supposedly
being taken as a guide. To avoid that circularity, legal theorists must focus
on the conflict that can always be found beneath the surface of apparent
consensus.
While Radin's methodology obscures the exercise of power, it also, para-
doxically, tends to treat power as irresistible. Radin's identification of com-
modification with the system of legal rules governing market transfer
effectively precludes an understanding of the possibility of resistance to the
forces that promote commodification. If market-alienability is fully permit-
ted, in her view, then we are fully commodified; if market-inalienability is
permitted to a limited extent, then we are partially commodified. For Radin,
the only way to counter commodification is to change the legal rules gov-
erning property and its transfer, making market-inalienable what was mar-
ket-alienable. Once we take that approach, decommodification inevitably
involves the imposition of a disability-that is, stripping someone of the
legal right to make a market transfer of an object or an aspect of herself.29
In contrast, I will argue in Part III that while commodification presup-
poses market exchange, the two are not identical. Rather, commodification
is best understood as a set of relations both at the workplace and in personal
consumption that systematically limits the potential for creativity and self-
development that people inevitably strive to exercise, no matter how con-
strained the opportunities for doing so. To put it another way, the phenome-
non of commodification ultimately is not simply imposed on people; it is a
process that can be resisted with varying degrees of success. We need to
consider how particular political strategies for empowering people could
help bring about a social order in which the dilemmas posed by commodifi-
cation would be less likely to arise in the first place. Focusing on such strate-
gies will, I believe, provide the programmatic context that Radin's theory
currently lacks, without requiring a necessitarian scheme of social change.
Radin's simultaneous erasure and exaltation of power reflects a failure to
come fully to terms with what Roberto Unger has called the modernist in-
sight: "[S]ociety is made and imagined .... a human artifact rather than the
expression of an underlying natural order."30 The failure manifests itself as
an oscillation between extremes. On the one hand, the appeal to consensus
(or in other legal theories, to tradition, social values, and the like) represents
an effort to find some aspect of difficult social and political questions that can
be taken as given instead of up for grabs. It amounts to a denial, at least to
the extent of the consensus, of the artifactual character of society. On the
29. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1919 n.249 (noting the costs of decom-
modifying labor).
30. UNGER, supra note 12, at 1.
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other hand, the single-minded focus on judicial decrees and legal rules, treat-
ing them as if they could be promulgated with virtually absolute effective-
ness, represents an implicit assumption that society is utterly plastic.
This contradictory attitude toward the artifactual character of society
marks most legal theorizing today,31 and severely undercuts the progressive
potential of legal theory. Because it is executed with such insight, Radin's
work provides a prime example of how that potential is undermined, and it
is well worth examining in detail.
II. RADIN'S THEORY OF PROPERTY AND PERSONHOOD
Radin's theory of property and personhood can be divided into two in-
quiries. The first seeks to determine what property is justifiably central to
personhood. The second asks what action would be most appropriate to
protect or vindicate justifiably personal interests. The answers to these in-
quiries form the basis of Radin's prescriptions for how the law should treat
various forms of property.
Radin's first inquiry involves a descriptive and individualized determina-
tion: What is central to a particular individual's personhood? In other
words, what property is crucial to the person's identity? For example, peo-
ple may regard their home of many years as an extension of themselves. To
them, a burglary would constitute a personal violation. 32 However, the cate-
gory of what is personal is not limited to objects; it also includes "personal
31. There are various, more specific ways of situating Radin's work. Eskridge and Peller de-
scribe an emerging genre of "New Public Law scholarship" that agrees with much of Critical Legal
Studies views about "interpretative indeterminacy and the social construction of reality," but envi-
sions a more centrist or reformist program of "dialogue, diversity, and pragmatic reasoning to
achieve just social results." William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement:
Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REv. 707, 764, 787 (1991). Although their
specific criticism of Radin's work lacks depth, see id at 786, her work can be situated within the
program they describe. One might also possibly relate Radin's project to what Mark Tushnet calls
"center-left Burkeanism," in which liberals invoke traditional values. See MARK TusHNET, RED,
WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRrICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 175-78 (1988); see also UN-
GER, supra note 12, at 139-41 (describing a stance of "modest eclecticism" as one response to the
predicament of social theory).
In the end, however, the most significant aspect of Radin's work for my purposes is what it
shares with much of contemporary legal theory: an assumption that the aim of legal theorizing is
what I have called "immediate persuasion." See Stephen J. Scbnably, Beyond Griswold: Fou-
cauldian and Republican Approaches to Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REv. 861, 871 (1991) (arguing that
much legal theorizing is undertaken with the implicit assumption that its task is an "'immediate'
form of persuasion, by which the Court directly responds with empathy and intellectual creativity to
the reasoned appeals of individuals"); see also id. at 948-54. For a similar critique of legal scholar-
ship, see Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 801 (1991).
The assumption that legal academics' central task is to persuade courts or other policy makers
what to do-an assumption that promotes inattention to the question of "how the prescription...
might realize itself in the social sphere," id at 879; see also Steven L. Winter, Without Privilege, 139
U. PA. L. REv. 1063, 1065 (1991)-inevitably if unintentionally tends to obscure the extent to which
our society systematically disregards the very ideals (e.g., respect for personhood) to which norma-
tive legal practice appeals. In my view, to make that observation is not to reject normative judgment
itself, but to question whether, taken in their current social context, conventional forms of academic
theorizing are capable of mounting any serious critique of the existing social order.
32. Similarly, a wedding ring may take on sentimental value distinct from its market price.
Radin, Personhood, supra note 16, at 959.
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attributes, relationships, and philosophical and moral commitments" that
are "integral to the self."33
This initial determination is not a matter of simple observation, because
one might embody oneself in ways that we think are wrong or unhealthy.
Thus, Radin searches for criteria to help distinguish things that people justi-
fiably regard as central to their personhood from those that evidence fetish-
ism. 34 To make this distinction, she looks to a substantive conception of
human flourishing.35 This notion of human flourishing rests on what Radin
calls "objective moral consensus."136 She does not set out her own theory of
human flourishing, nor does she appeal to notions of natural law.37 The
concept of human flourishing, in Radin's view, is informed by the normative
judgments that society makes based upon its historical experience. 38 These
judgments are reliable in some sense, but never rise above challenge.39
Radin's conception of human flourishing appeals to intuitive judgments.
She argues that we can distinguish justifiable embodiment from fetishism in
roughly the same way that we can distinguish someone who is healthy from
someone unhealthy.4° For example, according to Radin, the "compleat cap-
italist's" embodiment of self in control over enormous sums of money is not
33. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1905-06.
34. "Personal property marks out a category of things that become justifiably bound up with
the person and partly constitutive of personhood. Thus, a normative view of personhood, and hence
a normative view of human flourishing, is needed in order to identify which objects are appropriately
personal." Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property, supra note 3, at 1687.
35. Radin uses "personal property" to identify things which promote human flourishing:
I have attached the label "personal" to property that is connected, and is understood mor-
ally as rightly connected to the proper development and flourishing of persons, understood
primarily in its positive aspect, and I have attached the label "fungible" to property that is
not connected to persons in this way but instead is understood as representing interchange-
able units of exchange value.
Radin, Takings, supra note 6, at 257; see also Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property, supra note
3, at 1687 (arguing that, in the takings context, the Supreme Court should ask, "What conception of
human flourishing-of personhood in the context of community-are we fostering by sustaining or
disallowing" a particular statute?).
36. Radin, Personhood, supra note 16, at 969.
37. Id.; see also id at 961-62 (opting to seek "necessary objective criteria" by appeal to "the
concept of person itself," rather than by "appeal to extrinsic moral reality, [or] to scientific truths of
psychology").
38. See id at 969 n.44 ("[O]ur present state of philosophical enlightenment on the subject of
moral objectivity seems to be consonant with the argument that 'deep' moral consensus-not mere
social consensus, or subjective preference counting-should be treated as objective for political pur-
poses."); cf Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for
Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1143, 1176 & n.109 (1980) (arguing that judges should rely on "coherent
moral consensus of our society" to make moral judgments about appropriate punishment); Margaret
Jane Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death. Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 989, 1041-42 (1978) (arguing that courts should use "central moral
concepts of our system on which there is a consensus" to determine what is cruel and unusual
punishment).
39. Because society changes over time, Radin presents value judgments as mutable. For exam-
ple, she carefully notes that the judgment that the home should be treated as personal is one society
makes "in this time and place." Radin, Takings, supra note 6, at 259.
40. "We can tell the difference between personal property and fetishism the same way we can
tell the difference between a healthy person and a sick person, or between a sane person and an
insane person." Radin, Personhood, supra note 16, at 969; see also Radin, Market-Inalienability,
supra note 9, at 1908-09.
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"well-developed. ' '41 Similarly, it may be unhealthy to view one's body (or
parts of it) as a commodity to be traded on the market.42 In contrast, peo-
ple's involvement with their homes is healthy, 43 as may be their embodiment
in their cars.44
The ideal of human flourishing dictates that some embodiment is neces-
sary to personhood, at least in our society today. According to Radin, re-
spect for personhood requires us to reject "universal commodification," an
archetype of social interaction in which all things, including personal attrib-
utes and body parts, may be sold.45 Universal commodification is wrong
precisely because it leaves the person without any defining characteristics.4"
Consequently, in the case of personal goods or attributes, Radin rejects the
presumption that market intervention is justifiable, if at all, only to correct
market malfunctioning.47
Just as she rejects universal commodification, Radin also finds its
opposite-universal noncommodification-unsatisfying. Under universal
noncommodification, no property in which the self is embodied may be
bought or sold.4 8 In part, Radin's rejection of such a regime reflects her
concerns about the transition difficulties that would arise during any effort to
institute universal noncommodification; for example, she is sensitive to the
charge that forbidding prostitution could simply provide a cover for further
oppression of women whom society has already rendered powerless. 49 She
41. "The empire of the 'compleat capitalist,'... might contribute to her continuity and to her
own sense of fulfillment, but it would not contribute to her being a well-developed person, for the
'compleat capitalist' is not well-developed; she has embraced an inferior concept of human flourish-
ing." Radin, Rent Control, supra note 20, at 365; see also Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9,
at 1908 ("An example of an unjustifiable kind of relationship is the involvement of the robber baron
with an empire of 'property for power.' ") (citation omitted); Radin, Personhood, supra note 16, at
970 & n.48 ("Most people might consider... [the caricature capitalist] lacking in some essential
attribute of personhood, such as the capacity to respect other people or the environment.").
42. See Radin, Market Domain, supra note 9, at 181-82, 187-88; Radin, Market-Inalenability,
supra note 9, at 1913-14.
43. See Radin, Takings, supra note 6, at 257 ("Home-ownership carries greater moral weight
in the legal system than does ownership of vacant land held for investment."); Radin, The Liberal
Conception of Property, supra note 3, at 1689 ("The connection between people and residences is
recognizable by us as normatively appropriate."); Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1908
("An example of a justifiable kind of relationship is people's involvement with their homes. This
relationship permits self-constitution within a stable environment."); Radin, Personhood supra note
16, at 987 ("There is both a positive sense that people are bound up with their homes and a norma-
tive sense that this is not fetishistic.").
44. See Radin, Personhood, supra note 16, at 1001 ("Mhe reverence for cars in the popular
culture might suggest they are toward the personal end of the continuum.").
45. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1859-63; Radin, Market Domain, supra
note 9, at 167-68.
46. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1881 ("Systematically conceiving of per-
sonal attributes as fungible objects is threatening to personhood, because it detaches from the person
that which is integral to the person."); id. at 1905 ("Universal commodification undermines personal
identity by conceiving of personal attributes, relationships, and philosophical and moral commit-
ments as monetizable and alienable from the self.").
47. See id. at 1863-70.
48. See id. at 1871-77.
49. Id. at 1921-25; cf Radin, Market Domain, supra note 9, at 169 (asserting that in some
circumstances, measures to protect personhood may be "cruelly smug" because they harm the most
vulnerable).
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also appears to believe, however, that even in an ideal society some goods
could be treated as commodities without harming personhood. Nuts and
bolts, for example, may exist entirely in commodified form without causing
injury.50 Thus, Radin's ideal of human flourishing lies somewhere between
the poles of universal commodification and noncommodification.
Radin also indicates that the ideal sometimes may be communitarian,
rather than individualistic.5 1 We might, for example, be concerned about
the personhood of a long-established community of low-income tenants
whom rapid rent increases threatened to disperse.5 2 Moreover, just as an
individual's fetishism can indicate bad or unhealthy personhood, so too can
there be instances of bad community personhood.
5 3
Beyond these general outlines, Radin offers no comprehensive theory of
the ideal of human flourishing. Rather, she offers particular judgments
about particular issues. Her omission of a comprehensive theory can be at-
tributed to two considerations. First, because she bases her ideal of human
flourishing on what she perceives to be society's deepest consensual values,
the ideal extends only so far as there is any such consensus. Second, because
she believes that our society is characterized by consensus in some respects,
and by conflict in others,5 4 Radin's view can yield only particular consensual
social judgments, not a comprehensive vision of human flourishing.
The second inquiry in Radin's approach requires us to determine how to
treat the personal interests that we have identified in the first stage of the
analysis. This determination has two components. The first consists of a
decision as to which techniques to use to vindicate or protect the identified
personal interests. The second component is an evaluation, in light of our
nonideal circumstances, whether application of those techniques would be
appropriate.
With regard to the first component, one method is to favor personal over
50. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1912 ("[Nuts and bolts are pretty much
the 'same' whether commodified or not, whereas love, friendship, and sexuality are very 'different';
... trying to keep society free of commodified love, friendship, and sexuality morally matters more
than trying to keep it free of commodified nuts and bolts.").
51. See Radin, Rent Control, supra note 20, at 368 ("The personhood argument can be seen...
to have communitarian roots if the necessary objective judgment about the category of personal
property has a communitarian basis."); see also Radin, Personhood, supra note 16, at 1006 (referring
to the possibility that courts implicitly recognize group property rights grounded in personhood
concerns).
52. Radin does not assert whether a community has an existence distinct from the mere ag-
glomeration of its individuals or whether it is simply a much valued instrument for individual satis-
faction. See Radin, Rent Control, supra note 20, at 369. In any event, communities may find that
their continued existence depends on continued attachment to a particular set of property.
53. In a mostly white, suburban, middle-class community, "people's involvement with their
homes" may mean using zoning and other devices to exclude the poor and minorities. See notes 107-
110 infra and accompanying text. Radin addresses this concern with the assertion that excluding
outsiders "is not per se pro- or anti-personhood or pro- or anti-community; the evaluation depends
on the circumstances." Radin, Rent Control, supra note 20, at 380. Apparently this evaluation
would rest on the same distinctions between personal and fetishistic interests-a conception of
human flourishing. See id. ("The size of the community, its cohesiveness, and its need for exclusion-
ary practices in order to survive as a community" would have to be considered.).
54. Sea e.g., Radin, Takings, supra note 6, at 260-63.
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fungible property interests.55 For example, the state may, in effect, give ten-
ants permanent tenure on good behavior by restricting the right of landlords
to evict the tenants. Or the state may require a shopping center owner to
permit protesters to demonstrate on the premises. In each case, the individ-
uals with the personal interest (the tenants and the protesters) prevail over
the individuals with the fungible property interest (landlords and mall own-
ers). Favoring a personal interest could also mean giving it greater protec-
tion from state interference. For example, Radin suggests that the state
might be required to give better reasons for taking someone's home by emi-
nent domain than taking land held solely for investment.56 Or, even if we
were to regard bodily organs as property, we would likely decide that the
personal interest in them is so compelling that they could never be
condemned.5 7
A second technique for protecting a personal interest is to decommodify
it or make it market-inalienable, meaning that it can be given away but not
sold.58 Our ideal of human flourishing indicates that some attributes or
property should not exist in commodified form at- all, an assertion Radin
calls the "prohibition argument. ' 59 A clear example is the prohibition of
buying and selling human beings as slaves. Under this approach, we might
also forbid people from selling their kidneys or their sexual services, on the
ground that treating human bodies as commodities can never be consistent
with human flourishing.
The decision how to treat identified personal interests involves an evalua-
tion of whether decommodification is appropriate. This evaluation is more
complicated than it first appears. Although the ideal of human flourishing
provides primary guidance in deciding whether and to what extent to permit
market-alienability, Radin argues that we may diverge from what the ideal's
guidance would indicate. For one thing, there may be instances in which we
should prohibit commodification that would otherwise be consistent with
human flourishing. The principal justification for such a prohibition is the
55. Cf Radin, Personhood, supra note 16, at 978-79 ("[S]ome property is accorded more strin-
gent legal protection than other property, or is otherwise deemed more important than other prop-
erty by social consensus.").
56. See id. at 1005-06. Radin is careful to note that the law has not recognized a personhood
limitation on the power of eminent domain, although she does not find that necessarily inconsistent
with her theory:
[P]erhaps we are unwilling to presume that all single-family homes are personal because
many houses are held only for investment, and a subjective inquiry into each case slows
down government too much. On the other hand, perhaps the personhood perspective is so
deeply embedded that, without focusing on the problem, we expect that the condemning
authority will take fungible property where possible.
Id. at 1006.
57. Cf Radin, Takings, supra note 6, at 260 ("If we conceive of the body as property, can
kidneys be condemned for public use?").
58. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1850, 1875-76.
59. Id. at 1912. Radin does not argue that all personal property should be fully decommodi-
fled. See id. at 1911 n.227 (noting that personal things like "family heirlooms or a homestead" may




"domino effect." 60 For example, although some goods or attributes could
theoretically exist in both fungible and personal versions, 61 we might fear
that complete commodification eventually would follow partial commodifi-
cation.62 We may wish to prohibit the commodified version of a good or
attribute in order to prevent such an outcome.63
There also may be instances, Radin argues, where the ideal of human
flourishing points toward decommodification, but we may hesitate to follow
through in light of other circumstances. These circumstances include the
fact that we live in a nonideal world and that any transition to an ideal world
entails special considerations." The analysis thus requires nonideal evalua-
tion.65 The need for nonideal evaluation manifests itself in two overlapping
ways: the "double bind"66 and the transition problem.67
The dilemma of the double bind is posed by the possibility that, in
prohibiting market-alienability, we may harm the very people we mean to
protect. Thus, if we prohibit a poor person from selling one of her kidneys,
we deprive her of money that she may desperately need.68
Difficulties may also arise during the transition from commodification to
decommodification. For example, we might think that awarding money
damages in tort cases for pain and suffering or for loss of companionship
commodifies people's very existence by placing a dollar value on their lives
and feelings. A simple ban on the award of such damages, however, without
implementing other measures of compensation or care, would be unfair to
those who have suffered the injury. In other words, Radin asserts, allowing
damages for pain and suffering and for loss of companionship during the
transition to decommodification is a more just alternative.69
Recognition of the double bind and transition difficulties leads Radin to
favor "incomplete decommodification. ' 70 She suggests that we might per-
mit some limited right to sell a personal interest. For example, we might
refrain from criminalizing the sale of a personal interest, but also refuse to
enforce a contract of sale.
An example may help give substance to Radin's subtle and perceptive
60. Id at 1912-14.
61. But see id at 1923 n.260 (describing the argument that "the commodity form of a thing
might drive out the noncommodified version of the 'same' thing" and noting that the "domestic
services market... does coexist with a parallel class of unpaid providers").
62. See id at 1912-14.
63. For an example of a possible "domino effect" involving prostitution, see notes 71-78 infra
and accompanying text.
64. See Radin, Takings, supra note 6, at 266.
65. See id
66. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1915-17.
67. See id. at 1875-77; Radin, Takings, supra note 6, at 266.
68. Cf Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1915 -16 (noting argument that "[i]f the
law denies women the opportunity to be comfortable sex workers and baby producers instead of
subsistence domestics, assemblers, clerks, and waitresses - or pariahs (welfare recipients) and
criminals (prostitutes) - it keeps them out of the economic mainstream and hence the mainstream
of American life.").
69. Id at 1876-77.
70. See id at 1917-21.
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arguments about nonideal evaluation. She begins her discussion of prostitu-
tion with a prohibition argument: We might well want to forbid prostitution
entirely, based on a normative assertion that sexuality should not be a com-
modity at all.71 Radin then considers the possibility of a domino effect. If
sex were fully advertised as a commodity, it is possible that "[a] change
would occur in everyone's discourse about sex, and in particular about wo-
men's sexuality."' 72 It might become impossible for men and women to con-
duct sexual relationships on the basis of an "ideal of sexual interaction as
equal nonmonetized sharing."'73
After canvassing the reasons to outlaw prostitution, Radin engages in
nonideal evaluation and finds two problems with banning prostitution.
First, the problem of the double bind is exacerbated. When prostitution is
illegal, we may harm some women:
Poor women who believe that they must sell their sexual services to survive
are subject to moral opprobrium, disease, arrest, and violence. The ideal of
sexual sharing is related to identity and contextuality, but the identity of
those who sell is undermined by criminalization and powerlessness, and
their ability to develop and maintain relationships is hurt by these
circumstances. 74
Second, banning prostitution in an effort to decommodify sexuality may
amount to hypocrisy. Radin notes that sexuality may already be commodi-
fled to a large extent (by which she means primarily that prostitution is
widespread). 75 She also discusses the possibility that "male-female sexual
relationships that actually instantiate the ideal of equal sharing are under
current social circumstances rare or even impossible." 76 If we prohibit pros-
titution in the name of the ideal, we may simply deceive ourselves and op-
press women, especially those whose "class or race forecloses more socially
accepted forms of sexual bargaining."'77
In light of our nonideal circumstances, Radin proposes partial decom-
modification rather than full market-inalienability: She would allow prosti-
tution, but not brokering, advertising, or contract enforcement. She reaches
this conclusion by balancing the dangers of commodified sexuality against
the cautions introduced by nonideal evaluation. 78
71. Id. at 1921; see also id. at 1908 ("Commodified sex leaves the parties as separate individuals
and perhaps reinforces their separateness; they only engage in it if each individual considers it worth-
while. Noncommodified sex ideally diminishes separateness; it is conceived of as a union because it
is ideally a sharing of selves.").
72. Id. at 1922.
73. Id. at 1921.
74. Id. at 1922; see also id. at 1915-16.
75. Id. at 1921 & n.256. Interestingly, Radin makes no reference here to the pervasive way
that sexuality is used in advertising and thereby made a part of the system of commodities. For
elaboration on this point, see notes 207-208 infra and accompanying text.
76. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1922.
77. Id. at 1923.
78. Id. at 1924-25 & n.261. Radin's analysis of baby-selling proceeds along similar lines. See
id. at 1925-28. Her principal concern is that it may be too damaging to everyone's personhood to
permit any use of market rhetoric or mechanisms in deciding who will raise a child. Id. at 1927.
Consequently, she proposes that babies be made market-inalienable, rather than simply being par-
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As even this brief summary makes clear, Radin's analysis constitutes a
rich and highly contextual explication of the relationship between property
and personhood. Her approach is all the more interesting because it seems
pragmatic. Radin does not just point to the possibility of a double bind or
transition difficulty, and she does not simply tell us to restructure society
so that our problem will be easier to solve. Because she recognizes that thor-
oughgoing restructuring will not happen overnight and that it is not clear
what a reconstructed society should be like, she seeks to offer transitional
solutions for the here and now. The very attractiveness of her approach,
however, makes an investigation into its shortcomings all the more
important.
III. PERSONHOOD AS AN ARENA OF POWER AND RESISTANCE
Radin's approach has two key aspects. The first is an attempt to bracket
at least some normative issues and to apply a given consensus; the second is
a tendency to treat power as absolute. These characteristics deprive Radin's
theory of adequate tools either to account for, or to advocate, systemic social
change. In the following sections, I will elaborate on these aspects and sug-
gest two heuristic guides to help address the issues they raise.
The two heuristics are intended to help avoid the potentially conservative
implications of Radin's approach. First, rather than attempt to search out
and identify ideals as manifested at some general level of deep social consen-
sus, we ought to look for tensions in those ideals, even where-in fact, partic-
ularly where-consensus seems strongest. In doing this we ought to be
sensitive to the power relations that often contribute to the shaping of con-
sensus in its concrete form. One way to heighten our sensitivity to the inevi-
tably controversial character of widely shared norms is to identify the ways
in which policies carried out in the name of those norms actually help create
or compound social problems.
Second, rather than attempt to ferret out ways in which the law purport-
edly recognizes ideals of human flourishing, we should focus on people's
struggles to constitute personhood in conformity with their differing ideals
of what it should be. The ultimate aim of our analysis should not be to
facilitate the law's implementation of ideals we all supposedly share, but to
heighten our awareness of the conflicts that arise over the concrete meanings
tially decommodified. Id. at 1927-28. At base, her insistence on full decommodification even in a
nonideal world seems to rest on her belief that "our aversion to commodification of babies," id. at
1928, is stronger than our aversion to commodification of sexual services.
Radin's analysis of surrogacy is more tentative. She notes the interest in preventing women
from being fully commodified-treated as fungible wombs, hired for a fee to carry men's children.
See i d at 1928-30. She is also concerned about the possible domino effect, noting ways in which
widespread use of surrogacy contracts might undermine noncommodified adoption. Id. at 1930-32.
Further, permitting surrogacy may simply reinforce traditional stereotypes about women and repro-
duction. Id at 1930 & n.279. Once again, though, she is sensitive to the double bind in the form of
"even further oppression of poor or ignorant women." Id at 1930. She ends with a weak preference
for "a form of market-inalienability similar to our regime for ordinary adoption" over partial decom-
modification. Id at 1936.
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of those ideals. These contests over personhood become more evident once
we recognize the socially mediated nature of any given connection between
property and personhood. In contrast, Radin consistently portrays personal
interests in a direct, unmediated way, and envisions the resolution of con-
flicts involving personhood only in terms of the application of state power to
protect passive objects. This approach, I will argue, obscures the reality that
even the least powerful in our society still struggle for their interests in dis-
putes over property and personhood.
In short, the first heuristic points us to the contestable nature of seem-
ingly consensual social norms; the second, to the fact that such norms are
indeed contested. In the following sections, I will discuss the weaknesses of
Radin's theory and demonstrate how these two guides make possible a more
insightful analysis of property and personhood.
A. The Appeal to Consensus
Central to Radin's approach is the assumption, shared by many legal
theorists, that we can consider at least some legal issues separately from the
deeply controversial normative disputes that determine what people are and
should be like. This assumption appears to reflect a judgment that we can
sometimes bracket, or take as given, the normative question of how we as a
society come to view certain property as justifiably personal.79 When judges
or legislators decide to give heightened protection to the home, for example,
they simply apply a normative judgment drawn from a particular vision of
human flourishing that is assumed to be held by our society.
One could understand Radin's bracketing of certain areas as nothing
more than a prudent effort to keep the discussion within reasonable limits.
It certainly is not a denial of the fact that conflict and disagreement have a
very real part in our society.80 Rather, she seems to say that, although we
may not agree on everything, we do agree that people should be permitted
and encouraged to foster their own personhood, and that agreement entails
at least some definite consequences. Interesting points can be made about
property and personhood without fully elaborating and defending a general
conception of human flourishing.
A more ambitious aim, however, appears to lie behind Radin's strategy
of bracketing normative questions: preserving the very possibility of the rule
of law. Rejecting the notion that language alone can ever provide determi-
79. Interestingly, there is a parallel between the technique Radin uses to develop her theory of
property and personhood and that used by law and economics scholars. Both separate legal issues
from very controversial moral and political disputes concerning human characteristics and aspira-
tions. Radin takes the ideal of human flourishing as given for purposes of applying a rule at any
particular time in a given society. Mainstream economists take people's tastes or preferences as
given for purposes of economic analysis. See, eg., JACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLI-
CATIONS 127 (1976).
80. Radin's argument plainly is not that some deep consensus governs every aspect of our
society, but that there are at least some areas of deep consensus. Nor is her argument that the areas
of consensus that do exist will remain as such forever, or that they represent universal values; partic-
ular consensual judgments are valid "in this time and place." Radin, Takings, supra note 6, at 259.
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nate rules,8 1 Radin looks to shared social understandings as the basis for a
rule-like character of the law.8 2 Resting her analysis on a reading of
Wittgenstein that defines rules as essentially social and communitarian prac-
tices,83 Radin concludes that if there is to be any possibility of the rule of
law, we must be "one [community] in at least some sense(s)." '8 4 Hence she
attempts to identify at least some deeply embedded consensual values that
justify the application of legal rules. For the attempt to succeed, Radin must
make two assumptions about any given consensual social judgment: first,
that such a consensus, fairly-formed, exists; and, second, that application of
the consensual norms of personhood is somehow distinct from their
constitution.
Both assumptions are wrong. I will argue that there is never any true
consensus to follow. If we examine any particular area of "consensus"
closely, we will find deep disputes as well. Indeed, it is precisely with respect
to those values that seem most obviously uncontroversial that we should be
most skeptical. Moreover, even if we could identify some specific areas of
consensus, it would be impossible merely to follow the guidelines of that
consensus. Each time we purport merely to follow a given consensual norm,
we help constitute personhood in a way that reinforces that norm. Conse-
quently, because the process of drawing on consensus simultaneously fosters
and creates consensus, it is circular to try to draw on a given "consensus" to
guide the resolution of legal issues.
1. The nonexistence of consensus.
The assumption of fairly formed consensus raises several questions. For
example, to what degree is there really consensus over the issues pertaining
to property and personhood? How do we know that the consensus does not
simply reflect unjustifiable inequalities in power?
Once one acknowledges these issues, it becomes essential to conduct a
detailed and critical analysis of the fairness of the processes by which con-
tests over values are resolved, and indeed of the extent to which they pro-
duce any consensus at all. Although Radin takes note of the possibility that
there are no consensual values-that there is no one "we" to be the subject
of consensual values, 85 she does not systematically explore that possibility or
develop its implications. 86
81. See Radin, Rule of Law, supra note 3, at 814 ("A pragmatic reinterpretation of the Rule of
Law would at least deny that law consists of formally realizable rules in the traditional sense.").
82. Id. at 799-800 ("Only the fact of our seemingly 'natural' agreement on what are instances
of obeying rules permits us to say there are rules. The rules do not cause the agreement; rather, the
agreement causes us to say there are rules.").
83. See id at 797-801.
84. Id at 816 n.121.
85. See Radin, Pragmatist, supra note 7, at 1710-11 ("Dominant groups have tended to under-
stand themselves without question as the only 'we,' whereas oppressed groups, simply by virtue of
recognizing themselves as an oppressed group, have understood that there can be plural 'we's.' ");
Radin & Michelman, Critical Legal Practice, supra note 7, at 1047-48 (calling upon legal scholars to
be careful when searching for a deep moral consensus).
86. On the contrary, the recognition of some kind of deep social consensus remains basic to her
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Nor does Radin engage in any extended analysis of the possibility that,
even if there are values deeply embedded in our society, those values might
be morally wrong. She does discuss what she calls "bad coherence," recog-
nizing that coherence can be based on domination and oppression.87 She
briefly considers the possibility that in our society property itself is deeply
anti-personhood,8 8 and takes note of what she calls the position of "revolu-
tionary noncommodification." The latter "holds that the capitalist structure
permeates not only our world of social interaction and allocation of re-
sources but also our discourse, vocabulary, and conception of human flour-
ishing."' 89 These remarks might suggest a basis for strong skepticism toward
any effort to guide our views on personhood by some deep moral consensus.
Radin's decision, however, not to explore in depth the troubling indications
of a lack of true consensus may well reflect a conviction that there are at
least some significant areas of deep consensus or agreement, and that ex-
isting inequalities of wealth and power do not vitiate the moral relevance of
that consensus. I would question, however, whether our efforts are well
spent attempting to draw conclusions from what are thought to be areas of
agreement. Once we look beneath the surface of virtually any consensual or
objective ideal, tensions immediately become apparent.90
Consider Radin's assertion that "people's involvement with their homes
[is justifiable because it] ... permits self-constitution within a stable environ-
ment." 91 At this level of abstraction-a level typical of many assertions in
contemporary legal theory concerning social values-her characterization of
people's relationship to their homes may well seem intuitively obvious. But
the statement remains valid only if we disregard the actual social context in
which people relate to one another and to their property. In fact, people's
involvement with their homes is nowhere near as simple and uncontroversial
as Radin's presentation suggests.
It will be helpful to begin by unpacking the home as an ideal. Consider
the modem suburban home, which has its roots in the nineteenth century, 92
approach to law. See Radin, Personhood, supra note 16, at 969 n.44 (suggesting that "deep" moral
consensus "should be treated as objective for political purposes"). In later works, Radin's treatment
of objectivity is more tentative, but she still takes it as given that we must be "one in at least some
sense(s)" for the rule of law to be possible:
It seems to me that "we" are one community on the issue of whether 2 + 2 = 4, but
perhaps we are many diverse communities on other issues more readily regarded as ethical,
religious, or political. The pragmatic normative significance of our having a constitution is
to deny at least the furthest reaches of such pessimistic irreconcilable pluralism.
Radin, Rule of Law, supra note 3, at 816 n.121; see note 84 supra and accompanying text.
87. Radin, Pragmatist, supra note 7, at 1710-11; see note 85 supra and accompanying text.
88. See Radin, Personhood, supra note 16, at 970.
89. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1875.
90. The existence of tensions in the ideals that we "share" does not mean that there never can
be any degree of common ground in our society as to what constitutes human flourishing. Perhaps
even the most ardent adherent of market solutions to social problems would find a burgeoning mar-
ket in human kidneys at least somewhat degrading to personhood. But no meaningful conclusions
about particular issues will follow from consensus at such a general level; focusing on some highly
general level of consensus thus is unlikely to be productive.
91. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1908.
92. See generally JOHN R. STILGOE, BORDERLAND: ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN SUBURB,
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but really came into its own in the post-World War II era.93 Plainly, this is
what Radin has in mind when she speaks of the home: "The 'home'-usu-
ally conceived of as an owner-occupied single-family residence-seems to be
a paradigm case of personal property in our social context."'94 Even for the
many people who cannot in fact afford a private home, it remains an aspira-
tional ideal.
More particularly, the home represents a whole set of assumptions and
lived experiences. It is impossible to think about the meaning of the home
and its connection to personhood without thinking about its larger context.
For example, the ideal of the home goes hand in hand with the assumption
that fulfillment is primarily to be found in private life, rather than in com-
munal activities.95 Like its essential counterpart, the shopping mall, the sub-
urban home represents in many ways the rejection of public spaces. 96
Moreover, an essential part of our attachment to the home, suburban or
otherwise, is grounded in its status as the privileged locale for intimate rela-
tionships.97 The home and family are practically inseparable not only in
their conception, but also in their history: The rise of the home as an ideal
and social practice was closely linked to the creation of women's role as
homemakers. 98 Furthermore, one precondition to the development of the
home as a private refuge from public life was the separation of production
from family life.99 In that sense, the family is as much a creation of the labor
market as it is a refuge from it.
The ideal of the home also embodies ideas that extend beyond the con-
fines of domestic roles. One of those ideas is the notion that local communi-
1820-1939 (1988). Cf STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF PRIvATE LIFE: A HISTORY
OF AMERICAN FAMILIES 1600-1900, at 251-329 (1988) (noting the diversity of family types by class
and race even as the modern ideal of the family was being formed).
93. See, eg., Norval D. Glenn, Suburbanization in the United States Since World War II, in
THE URBANIZATION OF THE SUBURBS 51, 55-56 (Louis H. Masotti & Jeffrey K. Hadden eds., 1973)
(discussing sharp growth of suburban population in the period from 1950-1970).
94. See Radin, Rent Control, supra note 20, at 364.
95. The psychology of the suburbs reflects and reinforces this ideal: "The relative isolation of
people in [the suburban town of] Hampton from strangers is not only a fact of social morphology but
also a moral expectation.... [I]ndividuals who use the streets or other public places more than is
customary, especially for socializing, are seen as deviants." M.P. BAUMGARTNER, THE MORAL
ORDER OF A SUBURB 103 (1988).
96. Id. at 101-02. This rejection reflects a larger turn away from any notion of public culture.
See RICHARD SENNETT, THE FALL OF PUBLIC MAN 259-68 (1976).
97. See Gwendolyn Wright, Prescribing the Model Home, 58 SOC. RES. 213, 224 (1991)
("Home conveys other privileges as well: privacy, freedom from intrusions, autonomy for the family
and for consenting adults.").
98. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES 300 (1985) ("The dream house was designed around the needs of a bread-winning
male and a full-time housewife who would provide her prince with a haven from the cold outside
world ..... ); cf MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAw 269-71 (1990) (discussing the role of traditional family law in reinforcing gender-
based roles). For an excellent historical account of the suburban home and its relation to women's
roles, see MARGARET MARSH, SUBURBAN LIvES (1990); see also CooNTz, supra note 92, at 338-39
(emphasizing tensions within the ideal of domesticity and women's rules).
99. See Stephen J. Schnably, Normative Judgment, Social Change, and Legal Reasoning in the
Context of Abortion and Privacy, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 715, 854-55 (1984-1985).
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ties should be comprised of people of the same race and economic status.
This idea has become so rooted in people's everyday experience of suburban
life that it seems utterly natural. What diversity is to be found lies only in an
ersatz individuality exemplified by the pasting of different architectural
styles onto cookie-cutter homes.100 It is a telling mark of the artificiality of
such styles that Palos Verdes, a Los Angeles suburb developed in the 1920s,
mandated Mexican-style architecture even as it excluded Mexican-Ameri-
cans by means of restrictive covenants.10 1 Finally, in its most suburban
form, the ideal of the home represents the idea that problems of urban living
can be resolved by abandoning them 0 2 and that the automobile provides a
private solution to public transportation needs.103
Once one thinks more concretely about the home, doubts about its
healthiness are hard to suppress. In fact, people have called into question
each conception of the home mentioned above. By undermining the cult of
domesticity, the entry of women into the labor force has had a profound
impact on the suburban ideal of the home. 104 Indeed, the idea of the family
as a haven, a private world separate from power-perhaps the most defining
aspect of the home-has come under attack by feminists, who have shown
that it has contributed greatly to the subordination of women.' 05 These at-
tacks have been both theoretical and practical, constructive as well as criti-
cal. Setting up shelters for battered women represents one example. The
efforts of single mothers or of lesbians and gay men to create families outside
the model of the nuclear family provide others.'0 6 These efforts should
100. See STUART EWEN, ALL CONSUMING IMAGES: THE POLITICS OF STYLE IN CONTEMPO-
RARY CULTURE 229-30 (1988); MARSH, supra note 98, at 168 (noting that in the Los Angeles sub-
urbs, developers "attempted to create architectural harmony and to exclude any heterogeneity of
race or class"); Wright, supra note 97, at 213, 221-23.
101. See MARSH, supra note 98, at 172-73; GWENDOLYN WRIGHT, BUILDING THE DREAM: A
SOCIAL HISTORY OF HOUSING IN AMERICA 212 (1981) ("The quaint stylistic diversity of American
suburban architecture belied hostilities against ethnic minorities."). The residents of Palos Verdes
eventually resolved the contradiction by calling their architecture "Californian." MARSH, supra, at
175.
102. See JACKSON, supra note 98, at 272-82.
103. To be sure, the dream of home ownership can encompass a condominium in the city as
well. But there is no doubt that the ideal of the suburban home has had much to do with the general
neglect of public transportation, even in the cities. On the relation between the automobile and the
growth of a whole way of living and working around it, see id at 246-71; WRIGHT, supra note 101, at
205-08.
104. See MARSH, supra note 98, at 187-88.
105. See, eg., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1991);
see also Schnably, supra note 31, at 876-77 & nn.59-62 ("The bedroom can be a closet as much as a
sanctuary. It can also be... a place of coercion, an arena in which men dominate women.").
106. See Fajer, supra note 4, at 564-68 (challenging Supreme Court's claim in Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), that gay life does not involve "family"); Barbara Omolade, The Unbroken
Circle: A Historical Study of Black Single Mothers and Their Families, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF
LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 171 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Nancy Sweet Thomadsen
eds., 1991) (examining the long history of black single-mother families); see also Martha Albertson
Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the Natural Family: The Limits of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 955
(1991) (concluding that the view of single mothers as deviant from "natural family" prevents ade-
quate protection of single mothers' privacy); Washington Ordinance Tests Congress, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 10, 1992, at AI5 (noting the passage of an ordinance allowing registration of "domestic part-
ners" in Washington, D.C.).
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make us wary of any simple blessing of the traditional home. The home is as
much a place of domination and resistance, conflict and discord, as it is the
center of a "healthy" life. To be sure, the identification of private life with
the nuclear family ties the ideal of intimacy so closely to the reality of une-
qual power that any questioning of that power is often perceived as an attack
on the very possibility of intimacy itself. My aim, however, is not to deni-
grate the need for intimacy, but to emphasize that the home today is far
more a locus of conflict and struggle-both personal and social-than a
bland reference to "people's involvement with their homes" could ever
capture.
Nor have other aspects of the ideal of the home gone unquestioned. The
famous Mount Laurel cases attacked exclusionary zoning, a practice that
contributes to the division of housing into exclusive racial and socioeco-
nomic enclaves.10 7 Urban planners have increasingly called into question
other basic tenets of suburban development in the post-War era, such as the
concentration on providing each home with its own yard to the exclusion of
any common area, or the placement of houses outside walking distance from
stores.10 8 There is increasing recognition that unmanageable traffic and pol-
lution are the inevitable concomitants to sprawling suburbs, as well as a
greater sense of the limits to the demands that we can put on the environ-
ment in the name of growth.1' 9 Finally, the suburban shopping mall has
107. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336
A.2d 713 (holding that all municipalities in the state have a duty to provide a realistic opportunity
for affordable low- and middle-income housing), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); see also Paul K.
Stockman, Note, Anti-Snob Zoning in Massachusetts" Assessing One Attempt at Opening the Suburbs
to Affordable Housing, 78 VA. L. REv. 535, 550-59 (1992) (describing the requirements of the Mas-
sachusetts Low and Moderate Income Housing Act and its interpretation by the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in Board of Appeals v. Housing Appeals Comm., 363 Mass. 339, 294
N.E.2d 393 (1973)). There also have been efforts to create planned communities with a diversity of
income classes. See, eg., Heidi Daniel, Project Loses Its Originator, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 27, 1991, § 10,
at 8. As the experience of New Jersey after the Mount Laurel cases demonstrates, the actual impact
of these efforts is another question. See generally Martha Lamar, Alan Mallach & John M. Payne,
Mount Laurel at Work Affordable Housing in New Jersey, 1983-1988, 41 RUTGERS L. REv. 1197
(1989).
108. See Lucie White, Representing "The Real Deal," 45 U. MIAMI L. Rtv. 271, 285-86
(1990-1991); see also Peter Calthorpe, Pedestrian Pockets: New Strategies for Suburban Growth, in
THE PEDESTRIAN POCKET BooK: A NEw SUBURBAN DESIGN STRATEGY 7, 11 (Doug Kelbaugh
ed., 1989) ("[Ihe present suburban environment is not walkable, much to the detriment of children,
their chauffeur parents, the elderly, and the general health of the population."); Jane Holtz Kay,
Rebellion Spreads for Walkable Cities, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1991, at CIO (noting that "a new genera-
tion of urban design advocates" is promoting "walker-friendly design to improve the lot of the hap-
less pedestrian"); Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, Cities by Accident-or by Design? Sprawl threatens our
resources, MIAMi HERALD, Mar. 22, 1992, at 1C ("Besides damaging the natural environment, sub-
urban sprawl also threatens to decant the core of many of our cities and towns to nothingness in a
matter of years."); Timothy J. Trainor, "Traditional Neighborhoods"Make Gains, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
19, 1990, § 10, at 3 ("The chief aim of the traditional-neighborhood proponents is to integrate both
public and private uses into a more traditional urban grid system of streets, squares, parks and
amenities. Its foremost concern is pedestrian accessibility to everyday needs and then the accommo-
dation of the automobile as a modem necessity.").
109. See JACKSON, supra note 98, at 296-303; see also John Dorschner, Road to Ruin: When
All the Highway Construction Is Finally Over, We Will Have Built Ourselves One Big Traff c Jam,
MIAMI HERALD, July 10, 1988, TROPIC, at 8 (noting the impossibility of building enough highways
to handle traffic and arguing for efforts to bring jobs and housing in closer proximity).
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been criticized by urban planners, who want to remake it so as to resemble
the traditional town square, and by protesters who fear that the private own-
ership of shopping malls may thwart their exercise of First Amendment
rights. 110
Debates over commodification of the body, which includes the sale of
organs, babies, and sexual or reproductive services, also demonstrate the
lack of consensus. Radin seems implicitly to rely upon some form of objec-
tive consensus concerning bodily integrity. For example, she appears to as-
sume that prostitution would not exist in a world that completely embraced
the ideals of our society."1 This assumption is dictated by the ideal of sex-
ual relations that Radin calls "nonmonetized equal sharing."' " 2 In the case
of organ sales and surrogacy, the relevant ideal underlying Radin's analysis
seems to be that we should not treat our bodies as sources of fungible, mar-
ketable components.1 13
These characterizations of consensus are so general that they seem mean-
ingless. Perhaps this explains why Radin rarely refers explicitly to consen-
sual ideals in her consideration of commodification and the body. Although
110. On attempts to reconfigure suburban malls to make them the centerpiece of newly-devel-
oped "downtowns" with nearby housing, see, for example, Barbara Flanagan, A Suburban Mall is
Now "Downtown," N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1991, at CI. The Supreme Court has held that the First
Amendment does not protect peaceful protest on shopping center grounds, Hudgens v. NLRB, 424
U.S. 507, 512-21 (1976), but that the Fifth Amendment does not preclude a state from requiring
shopping centers to give access to protesters. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-85
(1980); cf Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854
(1979) (holding that the California Constitution protects speech and petitioning reasonably exer-
cised, in privately-owned shopping centers); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, 388 Mass. 83, 445
N.E.2d 590 (1983) (holding that a candidate has a right to solicit signatures on a petition for ballot
access under state constitution).
Efforts by protesters to distribute leaflets or picket in shopping malls demonstrate how little is
gained by focusing on consensus. These challenges, in Radin's view, implicate a deeply embedded
social preference for personal expression and self-development over the pursuit of profit. In Radin's
terminology, the shopping center owner has only a fungible interest-making a profit-while protes-
ters have a personhood interest--expressing their views. Radin argues that legal protection for the
protesters should follow as the consequence of a deep social consensus that favors personhood over
pure monetary interests. See Radin, Personhood, supra note 16, at 1008-09.
These cases, however, are better interpreted as demonstrating a lack of consensus concerning
personal development. Shopping mall owners do not seek to stifle all personal expression, but rather
to channel it into forms compatible with consumer culture. Thus, the real choice with respect to
expressive activity at shopping malls is between an environment designed only to spur personal
fulfillment through consumption and an environment that functions as a locus for collective, public
debate over political issues as well. Radin's assumption that our society favors personal expression
over fungible interests obscures that choice and inevitably blunts critical examination of the forces
that systematically promote self-realization through consumption of goods.
111. Of course, Radin's conclusion that partial decommodification is the best way to deal tem-
porarily with prostitution rests on nonideal considerations as well. See Radin, Market-Inalienability
supra note 9, at 1921-25.
112. Id. at 1921-22; see also id. at 1917 n.244 ("unmonetized sharing"); id at 1923 ("interper-
sonal sharing").
113. See id at 1928-36; Radin, Market Domain, supra note 9, at 187-88; see also A.M. Capron
& M.J. Radin, Choosing Family Law over Contract Law as a Paradigm for Surrogate Motherhood, 16
LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 34, 36 (1988) ("What is probably most remarkable about the debate
over surrogate motherhood is that it has necessitated defending a claim that was previously taken as
self-evident: namely, that society has an interest in people being regarded as intrinsically valuable,
not as monetized units in a marketplace.").
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her discussions of prostitution and surrogacy evince far greater awareness of
social conflict than does her analysis of other issues, she neither explores
these conflicts at length nor abandons her assumption of underlying
agreement. 114
A more sustained focus on our ideals regarding the body and sexuality,
examining the differing visions that seem to underlie opposition to corn-
modification of the body, would reveal deep disagreements over the concept
of human flourishing. For example, some might be concerned that sales of
body parts would exacerbate inequalities of race, income, and gender. The
poor-who tend disproportionately to be women and minorities-would not
only be more likely to sell their organs,' 15 but also might face discrimination
and economic exploitation in the agreements they made. 116 Similarly, some
might fear that widespread surrogacy would extend men's power over wo-
men's reproductive choices, thereby embedding women more deeply in ex-
isting structures of race, gender, and class discrimination. 117 Finally, the
prospect of legalizing prostitution might raise a similar concern: Prostitu-
tion objectifies women and encourages men to view them as instruments of
pleasure. 118
An alternative set of values, however, might produce uneasiness about
commodification. For example, a different sort of concern might be that the
sale of body parts is contrary to human nature, or arrogates to humankind a
god-like role. Similarly, surrogacy might trouble some because it entails tak-
ing conscious human control over reproduction and turns women into active
114. For example, with regard to prostitution, Radin acknowledges that "nonmonetized equal
sharing" may not currently be attainable in our society. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9,
at 1922-23. But she never questions that it remains a widely and deeply held value.
115. See Chris Hedges, Egypt's Desperate Trade: Body Parts for Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23,
1991, at Al; Onyeanusi v. Pan Am, 952 F.2d 788, 792 n.6 (3d Cir. 1992).
116. Minorities and lower income people would likely fare no better as sellers in the market
than they would as consumers. See generally ALAN R. ANDRASEN, THE DISADVANTAGED CON-
SUMER (1975); Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations,
104 HARV. L. REv. 817 (1991). Cf Jane Maslow Cohen, Posnerism, Pluralism, Pessimism, 67 B.U.
L. REV. 105, 172 (1987) (suggesting that many lower income women "will sell themselves short in a
Posnerian baby market because they do not understand their true costs, they cannot present value
their future losses, [and] their bargaining ability will be undercut by their still-less-sophisticated
sisters").
117. At the same time, feminists do not subscribe to a monolithic position on surrogacy and
related issues. Compare CARMEL SHALEV, BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY 166 (1989)
(justifying surrogacy contracts as feminist because they embody women's "personal human agency"
in reproductive decisions, "regardless of gender") with Barbara Katz Rothman, Surrogacy: A Ques-
tion of Values, in BEYOND BABY M: ETHIcAL IsSUEs IN NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNIQUES 235,
237, 240, 239 (Dianne M. Bartels, Reinhard Priester, Dorothy E. Vawter & Arthur L. Caplan eds.,
1990) (raising "radical feminist" objection that surrogacy "reduces the woman to a container" and
reinforces "patriarchal values"). Radin's brand of feminism similarly may be distinguishable from a
more liberal approach. See Margaret Jane Radin, Reflections on Objectification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
341, 350-51 (1991) (distinguishing feminism that, like Shalev's, takes a liberal approach from one
that is concerned with preserving women's personhood).
118. Radin insightfully discusses these concerns in the context of surrogacy and prostitution.
See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1921-36. For other discussions of surrogacy and
related issues, see LoRI ANDREWS, BETWEEN STRANGERS: SURROGATE MOTHERS, EXPECTANT
FATHERS, & BRAVE NEW BABIES (1989); MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1988);
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLITICS AND PRIVACY (Larry Gostin ed., 1990).
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participants in a market for reproduction. Furthermore, some may object
that both surrogacy and prostitution undermine the traditional conception
of a woman's role and her place within the family.119 Indeed, within the
larger social context, surrogacy could transform the character of the family
itself.120 These concerns are all animated by a fear that commodification
threatens established gender roles and social structures that many perceive
to be natural and right in themselves.
While these two sets of concerns are not necessarily mutually exclusive,
they are very different in tenor. They reflect differing visions of gender roles,
the structure of the family, and the appropriateness of conscious attempts to
control human biology. The first set of concerns echoes feminist, and to
some extent, liberal views regarding inequality and subordination. The sec-
ond set of concerns stems from the largely right-wing "traditionalist" per-
spective that has marked the right-to-life movement.' 21 However one labels
these concerns, the point remains clear: Even when there appears to be a
consensus on the surface, pervasive disputes exist not too far underneath-
not only between feminists and traditionalists, but among each group's mem-
bers as well. 122
Focusing on these divergent perspectives would be more productive than
speaking of some supposed consensus favoring "nonmonetized equal shar-
ing" or disfavoring the treatment of our bodies as sources of fungible parts.
119. Nadine Taub suggests that some attacks on surrogacy stem from a fear that women's
traditional virtues will be compromised:
There is something suspicious about a society's sudden and vociferous concern with
payment now that women propose to take compensation. I wonder whether people fear
that rewarding the reproductive functions of a woman will separate them from her overall
identity. The concern seems not to be that payment necessarily precludes dignity, but
perhaps that a woman's special quality depends on her role as gestator and nurturer.
Nadine Taub, Surrogacy: Sorting Through the Alternatives, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 285, 294
(1989-1990).
120. One commentator suggests that surrogacy threatens to blur the sharp distinction that
traditionalists draw between "the individualist world of economic interest and an idealized world of
affective relations [that] are supposed to exist within the family structure." Thomas C. Shevory,
Rethinking Public and Private Life via the Surrogacy Contract 8 POL. & THE LIFE Sci. 173, 182
(1990). Surrogacy arrangements could help break down this distinction, he argues, by "en-
courag[ing] sacrifice and altruism beyond the carefully delimited sphere of family life, where it is
generally confined in liberal societies." Id.
121. These differing perspectives are likely to have implications for a range of related issues.
For example, those who fear that prostitution undermines the traditional family may be far less
likely to support comparable worth legislation than those who object to prostitution on the grounds
that it embodies and supports men's power over women's bodies. Similarly, someone primarily con-
cerned with equality might have fewer qualms about in vitro fertilization than one who worries about
violating natural imperatives or religious commands. Feminist concerns about in vitro fertilization
are likely to go less to the question of whether people are arrogating to themselves god-like powers
and more to the prospect that women who undergo that procedure will be subjected even more
intensely to the strictures of sexism. See, eg., Gena Corea, The New Reproductive Technologies in
THE SEXUAL LIBERALS AND THE ATTACK ON FEMINISM 85, 92 (Dorchen Leidholdt & Janice G.
Raymond eds., 1990) [hereinafter ArACK ON FEMINISM] (discussing European feminists' concerns
that in vitro fertilization may "reduce women to breeders"); see also Radin, Market-Inalienability,
supra note 9, at 1930-32 (arguing that medical solutions to infertility emphasize the genetic aspects
of parenthood and may thereby reinforce patriarchy).
122. For a fuller account of these tensions, see Schnably, supra note 99, at 766-75.
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Although Radin's analysis of commodification is informed by a feminist sen-
sibility that gives it a richness that few other discussions of those issues
match, it seems odd to present that sensibility or vision as a set of deeply
embedded social values, precisely at the time when a key element of the
feminist project-securing women's reproductive rights-is under massive
assault. Any attempt to tie Radin's position to some general consensus will,
at best, lend the analysis an air of unreality.
Thus, both the conflict surrounding the traditional home and the ten-
sions underlying opposition to commodification of the body illustrate the
elusiveness of consensus. The moment we go beyond any extreme levels of
generality about the home, the air of consensus disappears both as a descrip-
tion and as a source of prescription. Similarly, a sustained analysis of our
ideals regarding the body and sexuality reveals deep disagreements about
human flourishing. In short, a focus on consensus simply cannot deliver
what it promises: a relatively uncontroversial basis for legal rules and
decisionmaking.
2. The impossibility of bracketing consensus.
In bracketing certain aspects of the vision of human flourishing, Radin
effectively assumes that the application of particular consensual norms of
personhood does not significantly affect those norms. This position, too, is
untenable.
Radin's theory of personhood appears to envisage a pre-contextual self
and a contextual self. The pre-contextual self first exists in a world of things
external to itself, none of which has any particular meaning for it. The con-
textual self is created only as the self becomes embodied in part of the exter-
nal world, binding the self's personhood with that aspect of the world; as a
result, that aspect of the external world takes on meaning for the self.123
Because the concept of pre-contextual selves is purely theoretical and
clearly unrealistic, the real weight of Radin's description of personhood is
carried by the assumption that the self is always contextual. 124 Although we
may embody ourselves in new and different things or give away or dispose of
things to which we were previously attached, we always begin as contextual-
ized beings. This observation has an important consequence for the possibil-
ity of bracketing consensus: Given that we are contextualized, the
investment of our personhood is necessarily influenced by our circumstances
and surroundings. At base, if I am to be confident that something is mine,
others must acknowledge my claim. Only the security of that recognition
allows me to see my personhood as bound up with that object. Because my
embodiment thus depends in part on others' acquiescence, their approval or
disapproval will influence my desires and goals.' 25 In short, what we as a
123. See Radin, Personhood, supra note 16, at 971-78 (giving an account of Hegel's theory of
property).
124. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1904-06; Radin, Personhood, supra note
16, at 959-61, 977-78 (discussing the context lent to the self through personal property).
125. Social condemnation might even strengthen one's commitment to embody oneself in a
January 1993]
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
society choose to recognize and protect as personal inevitably affects subse-
quent choices by individuals of how and where to embody themselves. 126
This evaluation of Radin's theory of self-embodiment suggests that even
in its most prototypically private guise-one person "involving herself" in
her home-the process must be profoundly social. By showing that individ-
ual embodiment is supported by powerful structural factors, a sociological
critique of Radin's approach to the home indicates that we could never sim-
ply apply any given ideal. Yet for all her invocation of consensual values,
Radin says remarkably little about the social and political issues that might
clarify how and why people invest their personhood in property.
We might begin to fill this gap with a basic question: Why do so many
people tend to identify with their homes? The assertion that this identifica-
tion is healthy reflects, in large part, the structural factors that make the
home and family life appear to be a "haven in a heartless world." 12 7 Behind
this popular sentiment lies an implicit acknowledgement of the fragmenta-
tion, degradation, and powerlessness that confront many people at work and
in other aspects of public life. To the extent that society fosters an environ-
ment that affords special personhood protection to the home rather than to
the workplace, people will be more likely to view the home as the locus of
their personal development. 128
Structural factors also account for the particular characteristics of the
ideal of the home mentioned earlier-its tendency to lack diversity, its iden-
tification with domestic gender roles, and its emphasis on private solutions
to public problems. To begin with, the rapid growth of suburbs in the post-
War era was not only a reflection of people's tastes, but was also a result of
significant federal assistance.1 29 The suburbs' homogeneity, consciously en-
particular way. Whatever the reaction, society's judgment almost certainly has an effect. One never
has a direct relation to the external world; its meaning for any individual is always socially mediated.
For a useful discussion of the effect of existing distributions of power and wealth on preferences, see
Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1145-58
(1986).
126. At some very general level, Radin would recognize this fact. She remarks that "every
application of [rules] is a reinterpretation.... [E]ach time we feel ourselves to be rule-followers we
are rule-creators as well." Radin, Rule of Law, supra note 3, at 819; see also SIDNEY W. MINTZ,
SWEETNESS AND POWER: THE PLACE OF SUGAR IN MODERN HISTORY 157 (1985):
We are able to perceive and interpret the world only in terms of pre-existing, culture-
specific systems for endowing reality with meaning. This perspective puts the cognitive
order between us and the world itself-we must think the world to be able to see (classify)
it, rather than the other way round-and it should be persuasive for anyone who considers
culture as the prime defining feature of human uniqueness.
However, Radin does not explore the implications of this observation in a systematic way.
127. See generally CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY
BESIEGED (1977).
128. For a more extensive discussion of the relationship between consumer culture and the
degradation of work, see notes 180-236 infra and accompanying text.
129. See JACKSON, supra note 98, at 190-218; Brian J. O'Connell, The Federal Role in the
Suburban Boom, in SUBURBIA RE-EXAMINED 183 (Barbara M. Kelly ed., 1989). For a description
of the role of the Federal Housing Administration in planning the course of residential development,
see MARC A. WEISS, THE RISE OF THE COMMUNITY BUILDERS: THE AMERICAN REAL ESTATE
INDUSTRY AND URBAN LAND PLANNING 141-58 (1987). Indeed, no pattern of land use is totally
unplanned; the only question is whether the planning will be subject to public controls. See Robert
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couraged by federal subsidies until the 1960s, 130 instantiated the racial and
economic inequalities that have characterized our society (and still do). Fur-
ther, the social choice in favor of the automobile was attributable not only to
the influence of the suburban home as an ideal, but also to the influence of
"private" actors with significant social power,131 and to the federal govern-
ment's decision to subsidize road-building to a far greater extent than public
transportation. 132
Nor are the gender roles associated with the traditional family somehow
natural or spontaneous creations. As feminists have noted, the family is in
important senses a creation of the law, which has given powerful support to
men's authority within the home.133 And surely many women's embrace of
the domestic roles traditionally accorded them had much to do with their
exclusion from the workplace or confinement to lower-paying jobs.
My point is not that the ideal of the home has been imposed on hapless
victims. Rather, I wish to emphasize that if we accept the theoretical obser-
vation that individual embodiment is always socially mediated, we must en-
gage in an analysis quite different from Radin's. The ideal of the home is not
one simply constructed by individuals, but is one that has been actively fos-
tered by the state and other "private" actors wielding significant social
Fisher, The Urban Sunbelt in Comparative Perspective Houston in Context, in ESSAYS ON SUNBELT
CITIES AND RECENT URBAN AMERICA 33, 40, 47 (Robert B. Fairbanks & Kathleen Underwood
eds., 1990).
130. See JACKSON, supra note 98, at 197-218; WRIGHT, supra note 101, at 247-48. For an
insightful analysis of the role of the government in promoting segregation in housing, and the meas-
ures that would be needed to counter the effects of that role, see Martha Mahoney, Note, Law and
Racial Geography: Public Housing and the Economy in New Orleans, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1251 (1990).
131. The charge that the "Big Three" automobile companies conspired to eliminate public rail
transit is well known, thanks to hearings held before a Senate subcommittee in 1974. See Hearings
on S. 1167 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1839-70 (1974) (statement of Bradford C. Snell); see also DAVID J. ST. CLAm,
THE MOTORIZATION OF AMERICAN CITIES 171-78 (1986) (expounding more nuanced version of
"social entrepreneurship"); GLENN YAGO, THE DECLINE OF TRANSIT: URBAN TRANSPORTATION
IN GERMAN AND U.S. CrIES, 1900-1970, at 49-76 (1984) (discussing the formation of U.S. national
transportation policy). For a critique of Snell's and St. Clair's arguments, see DONALD FINLAY
DAVIS, CONSPICUOUS PRODUCTION: AUTOMOBILES AND ELITES IN DETROIT, 1899-1933, at 159-
76 (1988).
132. For a discussion of the role of federal policies in the rise of the suburbs in the post-War
era, see King Cushman, Exploring the Land Development and Transit Connection, in TRANSIT,
LAND USE & URBAN FORM 9, 18-23 (Wayne Attoe ed., 1988).
133. Martha Minow argues that the family was never unaffected by the law:
Rather than marking a boundary limiting state intervention in the family, laws governing
the family define the kinds of families the state approves. The state once authorized the
male head of household to discipline his wife and children; later practices that refused
police protection for family members victimized by the husband established the kind of
behavior the law tolerated. Given background social practices, a policy of "noninterven-
tion" by the state bolstered the authority of the man. State-created rules about what
counts as a criminal assault regulate the family, determining, for example, whether the
state recognizes or refuses to recognize marital rape as "real rape," which can trigger the
criminal justice enforcement apparatus. Similarly, the laws governing who may marry, as
well as who may divorce, put the power of the state behind some agreements and not
others. More recently, adult and minor women have secured the legal right to obtain an
abortion free from the interference of other family members.
MiNow, supra note 98, at 276-77.
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power. Each decision to protect a personal interest necessarily reinforces the
ideal. Thus, those decisions can never be justified on the ground that we all
agree that the personal interests at issue should be protected; the question
always remains, should we further bolster the ideal by protecting it, or
should we think about fostering alternatives?
Thus, consensus cannot provide a guide to resolution of legal issues be-
cause there is no consensus in any meaningful sense. The moment we at-
tempt to identify a value as consensual, we engage in a practice that makes it
all too easy for exercises of power to remain hidden. Moreover, since the
law itself often shapes consensus, purporting to rely on consensus to shape
the law is a dangerous exercise in circularity. In attempting merely to apply
a given consensus, we necessarily strengthen it as well.134
My criticism is not that Radin's approach absolutely prevents us from
being aware that power is exercised over people, affecting their beliefs.
Rather, my objection is that her theory consistently tends to divert attention
from this reality. An analogy may be useful: A practitioner of law and eco-
nomics in theory may take account of costs that are hard to value in dollar
terms, but the law and economics approach makes them easy to ignore. 135
Similarly, nothing prevents one following Radin's approach from recogniz-
ing that any given social consensus is deeply influenced by power. By pro-
134. Thus, regardless of the merits of Radin's particular conclusions, her reliance on consensus
obscures important issues. For example, Radin cites Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969)
(holding that the First Amendment prohibits a state from convicting someone for possessing pornog-
raphy in his home), to support her claim that a social consensus supports the home as "affirmatively
part of oneself-property for personhood-and not just the agreed-on locale for protection from
outside interference." Radin, Personhood, supra note 16, at 991-92. To view Stanley as a relatively
straightforward outgrowth of consensus in favor of the home is too simple. If we thought more
concretely about the issue, we might consider the feminist concern that pornography not only deper-
sonalizes women, but also fosters red light districts, encourages violence against women, and bolsters
attitudes that promote sexual harassment at the workplace. See, eg., MACKiNNON, supra note 4, at
183-84; Caryn Jacobs, Patterns of Violence: A Feminist Perspective on the Regulation of Pornography,
7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.L 5, 18-23 (1984); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment,
1986 DuKE L.J. 589, 591-602; see also CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINsr THEORY
OF THE STATE 196-97 (1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINST THEORY OF THE STATE] (stating
that from a feminist perspective, pornography "with the rape and prostitution in which it partici-
pates, institutionalizes the sexuality of male supremacy, which fuses the erotization of dominance
and submission with the social construction of male and female"). The search for consensus too
easily leads us to ignore those concerns. Moreover, the image of staying the hand of the state to
respect some consensual ideal fits all too easily with an image of nonintervention into private life
that, as feminists have made clear, obscures the constitutive nature of the state's power.
My aim is not necessarily to decry Stanley's outcome, but to argue that any consideration of the
issue ought to highlight tensions within the ideal of the home, and address the question of what sort
of state "interventions" would best resolve them. These are far more deeply contested and difficult
political issues than a focus on social consensus suggests. Given the importance of context to
Radin's theory, her failure to analyze the actual social context of pornography is striking. Ironically,
the "texture of the human world," which Radin notes is damaged by law and economics talk about
the marginal value of rape to rapists-even if that talk is proffered in support of statutes criminaliz-
ing rape, Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1881-85 (citing HILARY PUTNAM, REASON,
TRUTH AND HISTORY 141 (1981))-is equally damaged by the straightforward invocation of per-
sonhood in support of Stanley.
135. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1878 (noting that law and economics
theoretically could take nonmonetizable values into account but in fact often fails to).
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viding no conceptual tools for incorporating that recognition into its
methodology, however, her approach makes it easy to overlook that fact.
3. The first heuristic
The first heuristic aims to supply the missing conceptual tools that will
allow Radin's theory to account for the power relations that help shape soci-
etal consensus. This heuristic prompts us to examine the tensions underly-
ing a supposedly consensual value and to consider the power relations that
were instrumental in creating it.136 In this section, I will show that a focus
on the tensions associated with the home would better contribute to the de-
bate over homelessness than would an emphasis on a supposedly shared
agreement on the importance of personal embodiment in the home. The
"consensual" values we hold may in fact underlie policies that compound a
serious social problem in the first place.
Radin's invocation of the home as a shared ideal raises an interesting
question: What might her work tell us about people who have no homes?
Although Radin herself does not address this issue,137 her analysis has sig-
nificant implications for the problem of homelessness. The seemingly uncon-
troversial assertion that "personal embodiment in the home is good" might
seem to support two conclusions. First, home-like relationships to property
or places are entitled to heightened respect, similar to that which we accord
homes;' 38 perhaps we should treat nonconventional living spaces, for exam-
ple, the area under a bridge, as homes, at least for Fourth Amendment
purposes. 139
The second and more sweeping assertion that might be derived from Ra-
din's approach is that people should have homes-or at least, should not be
deprived of the opportunity to have them due to circumstances beyond their
control.14° Perhaps, then, we should recognize a personal stake in access to
136. This heuristic has undergirded my critique of reliance on consensus in the context of the
ideals of embodiment in the home and of bodily integrity.
137. For a useful discussion of personality theory and the homeless, see Rosendorf, supra note
10, at 710-12. For background on the extent of homelessness, see MARTHA R. BRtT, OVER THE
EDGE: THE GROWTH OF HOMELESSNES IN THE 1980s, at 11-30 (1992); Carol L.M. Caton, The
Epidemiology of Homelessness. in HOMELESS IN AMERICA 19, 22-29 (Carol L.M. Caton ed., 1990);
White, supra note 108, at 275-79.
138. Radin rejects any suggestion that the homeless should be deprived of the personhood
protections that our society normally associates with having a home:
I do not mean to suggest that one must have property or a home to be a person at all.
The homeless are surely persons. The argument here might suggest that by virtue of their
personhood they are owed homes, not that our failure to ensure that they have homes
renders them non-persons beyond our concern.
Radin, Rent Control, supra note 20, at 365.
139. In State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85, 111-12, 588 A.2d 145, 160-61, cert denied, 112 S. Ct.
330 (1991), the Connecticut Supreme Court held that a homeless person suspected of murder had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a duffel bag and cardboard box that he kept stowed away under
a bridge where he regularly slept. Without directly ruling that it should be treated as his home, the
court gave great weight to Mooney's treatment of the area as such, and invalidated the warrantless
search of the duffel bag and cardboard box. Id.
140. See Radin, Personhood, supra note 16, at 990 ("If the personhood dichotomy in property
is taken as the source of a distributive mandate as part of... a general theory [of welfare rights or
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vacant residential buildings under some circumstances, 141 or create "safe
zones" in which those lacking homes can carry on the daily activities of life
without fear of arrest.142 Aside from the many ways in which having a
home makes full personhood possible in our society, the denial of housing to
homeless people when residential buildings remain vacant and boarded up
dramatically instantiates society's indifference to their fate.
Despite its potential attractions, however, such an analysis seems seri-
ously inadequate. To put it as bluntly as possible, do we really want home-
less people to have "homes?" We can ask this question without asserting
that the homeless are somehow entirely different in their aspirations from
everyone else, or simply less deserving. 143 My point is that in deciding what
to do about the problem of people who lack homes, we ought to think criti-
cally about the traditional idea of the home as a private enclave, grounded in
racial and economic exclusion and in the degradation of public space. Pre-
cisely because the ideal is a deeply contested one, it would be strange to
think that the long-term solution to homelessness should be the opportunity
for everyone to buy into the suburbs. 1 "4
Proceeding as if there were some relatively neutral or uncontroversial
agreement on the value of personal embodiment in the home not only is
inaccurate, but also reinforces many of the values that promote the problem
of homelessness in the first place. For example, uncritical acceptance of the
aspect of the ideal that glorifies personal choice may promote the idea that it
is the homeless' choice to live as they do.145 This kind of attitude may un-
minimal entitlement], it would suggest that government should make it possible for all citizens to
have whatever property is necessary for personhood."). Extrapolating from Radin's remarks about
warrantless searches of cars, the argument for this proposition would be that "private enclaves are
needed for personhood to develop and flourish, and... our society is now one in which many
people's homes are not that sort of enclave"; consequently, a "liberal government that must respect
personhood" should "make it possible for people to treat" certain open areas like their homes. Id. at
1001.
141. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 10, at 106-08; Margaret Jane Radin, Time, Posses-
sion, and Alienation, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 739, 745-47 (1986); Rosendorf, supra note 10, at 722-26;
Steven L. Winter, Foreword: On Building Houses, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1595, 1624-25 (1991); Ann Mari-
ano, Advocates Stand Up for Poor, Homeless; Campaign to Move Families into HUD Properties Takes
Hold in D.C., WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1990, at El (describing squatters' campaign to force federal
government to turn over empty federal property to homeless); Chuck Taylor, Police Clear Building,
Homeless Evicted; 4-Day Occupation of Building Kindles Ideas on Housing, SEATrLE TIMES, May
24, 1991, at Cl; Rudolph Unger, Trespassing Charges Dropped Against Homeless Activists, CHI.
TRm., Aug. 18, 1988, § 2, at 4.
142. See Pottinger v. City of Miami, No. 88-2406, slip op. at 77 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 1992).
143. Thus, I do not mean to question the need for shelter, or to assert that the homeless should
accept as the ultimate solution to the housing shortage the dangerous, underfunded, and over-
crowded shelters to which society seems all too willing to relegate them. See Carol L.M. Caton,
Crisis Shelter and Housing Programs, in HOMELESS IN AMERICA, supra note 137, at 110, 114-15;
Gregory L. Evans, Federal Emergency Shelter Assistance to the Homeless: Mandating a Standard of
Decency, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & Pua. POL'Y 325, 325-26 (1989); Celia W. Dugger, Big
Shelters Hold Terrors for the Mentally 1ll, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1992, at Al; Thomas Morgan, Fear
and Dependency Jostle in Shelters, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1991, at Al.
144. See notes 85-110 supra and accompanying text.
145. President Ronald Reagan remarked that even in "the best of times," the United States has
been beset by the problem of "the homeless who are homeless, you might say, by choice." Juan
Williams, Homeless Choose to Be, Reagan Says, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1984, at Al. Similarly, then-
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dermine society's commitment to help the homeless by encouraging us to
overlook the social circumstances that lead to homelessness.
There are, however, many more concrete ways in which uncritical ac-
ceptance of the ideal of the home obscures the sources of the problem. Unre-
flective support of the ideal underlies a housing policy that subsidizes
middle-class housing through the tax system,146 while at the same time cut-
ting back on housing subsidies that would benefit the poor.1 47 The resulting
social investment in middle-class homes reinforces and entrenches the subur-
ban ideal. 148 It is a simplification, but a revealing one, to say that the ideal
of the home and homelessness are two sides of the same coin.149
Another tension that affects our treatment of homelessness is the enclave
consciousness that is an offshoot of our ideal of the home and community.
White House counselor Edwin Meese III once claimed that people went to soup kitchens because it
was cheaper than buying food. See David Hoffman, Discussing Hunger in U.S., Meese Sparks a
Firestorm, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 1983, at Al.
146. See MICHAEL H. LANG, HOMELESSNESS AMID AFFLUENCE: STRUCTURE AND PARA-
DOX IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 84-86 (1989); Todd Swanstrom, No Room at the Inn:
Housing Policy and the Homeless, 35 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 81, 88-90 (1989).
147. For analyses of the trade-off between middle-class mortgage subsidies and support for
low-income housing, see ANN BRADEN JOHNSON, OUT OF BEDLAM: THE TRUTH ABOUT DEINSTI-
TUTIONALIZATION 137-38 (1990); LANG, supra note 146, at 67-93; M.H. Hoeflich & John E. Thies,
Rethinking American Housing Policy: Defederalizing Subsidized Housing, 1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 629,
630-31; Peter Marcuse, Homelessness and Housing Policy, in HOMELESS IN AMERICA, supra note
137, at 138; Swanstrom, supra note 146, at 81. The drastic cutbacks in federal support for low-
income housing in the 1980s were part of a broader right-wing attack on any spending to alleviate
poverty. See generally FRED BLOCK, RICHARD A. CLOWARD, BARBARA EHRENREICH & FRANCES
Fox PivEN, THE MEAN SEASON: THE ATACK ON THE WELFARE STATE (1987); FRANCES Fox
PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, THE NEW CLASS WAR: REAGAN'S ATTACK ON THE WELFARE
STATE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1982).
148. See notes 129-133 supra and accompanying text.
149. Related to the failure to provide adequate housing subsidies for the poor is the failure to
provide adequate support for community living by the mentally ill who have been deinstitutional-
ized. To be sure, there is great controversy over the extent to which deinstitutionalization has con-
tributed to the rise of homelessness. Compare JOHNSON, supra note 147, at 134-57 (stating that the
homelessness of the mentally ill is primarily caused by welfare, housing, and unemployment policies)
with E. FULLER TORREY, NOWHERE TO Go: THE TRAGIC ODYSSEY OF THE HOMELESS MEN-
TALLY ILL 138-42, 203-04 (1988) (arguing that deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill is a major
cause of the homeless problem). See also Paula F. Eagle & Carol L.M. Caton, Homelessness and
Mental llnes, in HOMELESS IN AMERICA, supra note 137, at 59, 70-72 (citing both deinstitutional-
ization and "an acute shortage" of "structured supportive housing arrangements" as causes of the
homeless problem).
Regardless of the importance of deinstitutionalization as a cause of homelessness, two things are
certain. First, blaming homelessness in general on deinstitutionalization is a convenient way to
avoid dealing with the real contribution that cut-backs in the safety net have made. Significantly,
homelessness in past years appears to have meant having only enough money to sleep in skid row
hotels, not being condemned to the streets. See BURT, supra note 137, at 108-09, 117-23; see also
JOHNSON, supra note 147, at 149-50 ('The mentally ill, like the children of poverty, are among the
people most likely to become homeless. To have stretched this simple fact into a causal relationship
has.., encouraged all of us to avoid looking at the serious weaknesses in our larger housing and
welfare policies."); Marcuse, supra note 147, at 152-53 (noting the tendency to blame homelessness
on "personality disorders" without even mentioning the housing shortage). Second, attempts to
provide the mentally ill with halfway houses or other forms of community living are often met with
near-hysterical opposition by many homeowners in the neighborhood of the proposed facility. See
Caton, supra note 143, at 133-34. Such opposition stems in no small part from the extent to which
people identify their own personhood with their homes, and instinctively question the personhood of
those who do not have homes. See notes 150-151 infra and accompanying text.
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For many, pursuing this ideal means staking a significant portion of their
wealth in it, rendering people constantly on guard against any conceivable
threat to property values. Those who possess homes come to view their
ownership of, and attachment to, their houses as normal. One who does not
have a home must, therefore, be abnormal, and possibly even dangerous.15 0
Thus, there is a powerful tendency to confine homeless shelters, as well as
low-income housing generally, to enclaves in inner cities. Attempts to locate
them in upper middle-class urban areas or in the suburbs typically meet with
lawsuits and extreme opposition. 15 1 The result of this tendency is that both
long- and short-term efforts to meet housing needs for the homeless are
likely to reflect the racial and economic exclusion that permeates the ideal of
the home.152
Finally, when the home becomes a haven or refuge, privacy can easily
mean invisibility;1 53 and the distance from the private home to the invisible
homeless is not great. Typically, anti-homeless legislation aims to keep the
homeless out of public view or out of public spaces.1 54 Kreimer v. Bureau of
150. See Wolfgang Fach & Anne Hodgson, Common Sense: the Demand Side, the Supply Side
and the Far Side, TELOS, Number 86, Winter 1990-91, at 3, 21 (arguing that the homeless "are
transformed into habitual offenders, 'delinquents,' who can be stigmatized reliably and who in that
way (unwillingly, of course) reconfirm the normality of their benefactors"). On the long history of
labeling the homeless as "troubled-and troublesome-individuals," see Kim Hopper, The Ordeal of
Shelter: Continuities and Discontinuities in the Public Response to Homelessness, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 301, 311-12 (1989).
151. See LANG, supra note 146, at 176-78 (noting suburban opposition to shelters); Caton,
supra note 143, at 133-37; note 143 supra; see also John N. Lozier, Mandy Johnson & Joan Haynes,
Overcoming Troubled Relationships Between Programs and the Community, in UNDER THE SAFETY
NET: THE HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE OF THE HOMELESS IN THE UNITED STATES 32 (Philip
W. Brickner, Linda Keen Scharer, Barbara A. Conanan, Marianne Savarese & Brian C. Scanlan
eds., 1990) [hereinafter SAFETY NET]; Carl Goldfarb, Homeless Center Proposal in Grove Met by
Opposition, MIAMI HERALD, June 7, 1991, at 3B; cf Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v.
Lynn, 524 F.2d 225, 230-32 (7th Cir. 1975) (rejecting plaintiffs' request for the preparation of an
environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to forestall
the placement of low-income housing in neighborhood), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976).
In turn, the tendency to confine shelters to the poorest and least politically powerful areas leads
to tensions between the poor and the homeless. See Celia W. Dugger, Here, Poorest are Resented by
the Poor: Longtime Residents See Homeless as Interlopers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1991, at Bi; David
Gonzalez & Celia W. Dugger, A Neighborhood Struggle With Despair, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1991, at
Al. This tension helps divide groups that otherwise might have a common cause against right-wing
social policies.
152. See generally Katherine C. Devers & J. Gardner West, Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Its
Effect on Housing Opportunities for the Homeless, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 349
(1989).
153. Thus, "the family can be-and often is-the locus of violence and sexual abuse, hidden
from view all the more effectively because it is deemed private." T.A. Tucker Ronzetti, Comment,
Constituting Family and Death Through the Struggle with State Power: Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department of Health, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 149, 174-175 (1991).
154. See Sara Rimer, Doors Closing as Mood on the Homeless Sours, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18,
1989, at Al. In Miami, the police in the past have used misdemeanor ordinances, such as nuisance
and littering laws, to arrest homeless persons prior to events such as the Orange Bowl Parade and
the 1987 visit by Pope John Paul II "to force the homeless off the streets and out of sight." Carlos
Harrison, ACLU to Miamf" Stop Harassing Homeless, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 30, 1988, at ID; see
also Pottinger v. City of Miami, 720 F. Supp. 955, 957 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (certifying a class of approxi-
mately 5000 homeless people to bring suit against the city of Miami for violating their constitutional
rights); Donald E. Baker, Comment, "A nti-Homeless"Legislation: Unconstitutional Efforts to Punish
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Police,155 a case that attracted nationwide attention, 156 concerned one town's
ultimately successful effort to keep the homeless out of its public library.1 57
People should do their living in private, not in full view of everyone; that is
the spirit of many anti-homeless laws, and it fits all too comfortably with the
valorization of the private home as the exclusive area of personal growth and
development.
In short, applying "consensus" in favor of the home will not yield solu-
tions to the problem of homelessness. By directing our attention to what is
most problematic about the home as an ideal, the first heuristic helps us see
the ways in which any existing social consensus reflects power relations, and
therefore is subject to change in the event of a shift in those power relations.
As a result, this approach is likely to produce more powerful insights into
the origin of homelessness and its possible solutions.
B. Commodification as Absolute Power
While Radin tends to disregard the exercise of power in shaping consen-
sus, she also, paradoxically, treats power as completely dispositive. In Ra-
din's conception, commodification utterly disempowers people; the only
solution is for the state to counter commodification by imposing rules of
market-inalienability. This conception of commodification ignores the po-
tential for resistance. For all Radin's concern for personhood, her theory
views individuals as the passive beneficiaries of a personhood-respecting
state.
The problem with such an account is that it depicts an essentially static
society-a society in which the sources of change remain hidden and ob-
scure. Radin's failure to examine consensus critically or to address the ef-
fects of power in the shaping of consensus gives her theory an implicit
conservative bias.
The problem can be restated in Radin's terminology. Treating people as
passive objects renders the double bind pervasive and unresolvable. If com-
modification leaves people as utterly disempowered as Radin's treatment im-
the Homeless, 45 U. MiAMI L. REv. 417, 419 (1990-1991) (describing a "clash of competing inter-
ests between homeless persons' exigency to perform fundamental life activities in public, and non-
homeless citizens' desire to be able to utilize freely public facilities without encountering 'unsightly'
homeless people"); cf Isabel Wilkerson, Shift in Feelings on the Homeless: Empathy Turns Into
Frustration, N.Y. TimEs, Sept. 2, 1991, at Al (noting trend to enact "harsher restrictions on home-
less people to reduce their visibility" or force them to leave town).
155. 765 F. Supp. 181 (D.N.J. 1991) (Kreimer I), rev'd, 958 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1992) (Kreimer
II).
156. See, eg., David Ellis, Star of His Own Sad Comedy, TIME, Mar. 9, 1992, at 62-63.
157. Granted, the ordinance did not exclude the homeless per se, but rather permitted library
officials to ban anyone whose "bodily hygiene" was "offensive." Kreimer, 765 F. Supp. at 184. The
Third Circuit reversed the district court's ruling that the statute was unconstitutional and held that
because the "homeless do not constitute a suspect class," only a rational basis standard of review
would apply. KreimerlI, 958 F.2d at 1269 n.36. Still, it is difficult to see this ordinance as anything
other than an effort to deal with the problem of homelessness by keeping it out of sight. Cf Kreimer
1, 765 F. Supp. at 183 ("If we wish to shield our eyes and noses from the homeless, we should revoke
their condition, not their library cards.").
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plies, then the only way to promote decommodification is for the state to
disable people by stripping them of the right to sell some relevant attribute.
Alternatively, the state could partially decommodify them by partially disa-
bling them-that is, by limiting the terms under which they may sell that
attribute. Any measure that advances partial or complete decommodifica-
tion will be vulnerable to the charge that it disrespects the very objects of its
protection by prohibiting them from entering into a market transaction to
which they would otherwise agree.
1. The tendency toward stasis.
Examples of the tendency. The relatively static character of Radin's
analysis has two manifestations. The first is a bias toward the status quo
that results from her efforts to glean from existing case law evidence con-
firming society's adoption of consensual values. The second manifestation is
Radin's apparent inability to relate her nonideal evaluations to some broader
program of social change.
As one example of social confirmation of consensus, Radin finds support
in a wide variety of legal doctrines for the personhood interest in the home.
For example, she points to anti-eviction provisions found in rent control leg-
islation as an indication that society recognizes this interest, at least implic-
itly.158 This assertion, however, is fundamentally flawed: The vast majority
of lower-income people who live in apartments are not protected by anti-
eviction and rent control laws.159 With so little housing thus protected, it
seems unlikely that rent control reflects a consensus on the importance of the
home. Indeed, rent control is constantly under attack from the right, 160 and
even when local governments invoke "protective" legislation like housing
codes, they may sometimes do so as a ploy to rid the locality of people of
color or those with lower incomes. 161 By treating tenant-protective legisla-
158. See Radin, Rent Control, supra note 20, at 372.
159. Although there are no definitive statistics, it is clear that rent control covers only a small
minority of housing in the United States. See Kenneth K. Baar, Guidelines for Drafting Rent Con-
trol Laws: Lessons of a Decade, 35 RUTGERS L. REv. 723, 725 n.1 (1983); see also Brief of the
National Multi Housing Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants at 8, Pennell v. San
Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988) (No. 86-753) (asserting that "[t]oday, approximately 200 communities con-
tinue to have some form of rent control. Virtually nll are located on the East and West Coasts,
where rental units make up an important part of the market."). Granted, market conditions every-
where may not require rent control to protect lower-income tenants; even so, it seems likely that
there are large numbers of lower-income tenants who lack needed protection. Moreover, there is
little evidence that, where enacted, rent control statutes have in fact brought down rents to levels
more affordable to lower-income people, see JOHN I. GILDERBLOOM & RICHARD P. APPELBAUM,
RETHINKING RENTAL HOUSING 127-49 (1988), which may cast into doubt the strength of any
supposed social commitment to a personhood interest in lower-income people's homes.
160. Rent control became a national issue in the late 1980s when the Reagan Administration
attempted to discourage localities from adopting it. See Robert Pear, Rent Control is Target of
Reagan Budget, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 8, 1988, at A32 (noting plan in draft budget to cut off federal
funds for housing repairs to cities that have rent control); Robert Kuttner, Reagan is Hypocritical on
Rent Control, NEWSDAY, Jan. 14, 1988, at 83 (same).
161. See Lisbeth Haas, Grass-Roots Protest and the Politics of Planning: Santa Ana, 1976-88, in
POSTSUBURBAN CALIFORNIA: THE TRANSFORMATION OF ORANGE COUNTY SINCE WORLD WAR
II, at 254, 267-71 (Rob Kling, Spencer Olin & Mark Poster eds., 1991).
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tion as evidence of consensus, Radin inadvertently runs a great risk of
encouraging complacency toward the forces in our society that do not re-
spect long-standing ties of lower-income tenants to their homes and
neighborhoods.
Another example of the same approach is Radin's assertion that "collec-
tive bargaining, minimum wage requirements, maximum hour limitations,
health and safety requirements, unemployment insurance, retirement bene-
fits, prohibition of child labor, and antidiscrimination requirements" can be
understood as "an effort to take into account workers'... personhood, to
recognize and foster the nonmarket significance of their work." 162 This ac-
count implicitly depicts a gradual and growing social effort to decommodify
labor. The history of labor law, however, contradicts this implication;
American business has sought relentlessly to reverse the gains obtained by
labor through militancy and conflict during the 1930s. Moreover, labor leg-
islation is deeply ambiguous, for it also has played a role in the further com-
modification of labor by integrating workers into a stabilizing corporate
structure that tends to treat them as simple inputs into the production pro-
cess. 1 63 An understanding of labor laws as indicative of widespread social
respect for personhood is thus ahistorical and acontextual, explaining little if
anything about the origin and current significance of such laws.
In short, Radin's efforts to demonstrate the law's recognition of per-
sonhood interests is flawed because she too often overlooks the extent to
which society systematically disrespects those interests. The systemic nature
of that disrespect calls into question whether those values are consensual at
all. Equally important, the search for glimpses of consensual values emerg-
ing in the law too easily leads Radin to overlook the struggles that have
produced the very glimpses she finds. By projecting an image of a society
not subject to struggle and conflict, Radin unfortunately downplays its ma-
jor source of dynamism. Whenever a theory fails to consider how social
changes come about, the danger of a conservative bias comes to the fore.
Radin's discussion of kidney-selling illustrates the second form the po-
tential for conservatism can take: a failure to indicate, even if only tenta-
tively, how to relate particular nonideal evaluations to a more general
program of change. She begins with the premise that organ sales harm per-
162. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1919-20.
163. See Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern
Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MmIN. L. REv. 265, 268-69 (1978) (arguing that judicial inter-
pretation of the Wagner Act created "the rudiments of what later became an increasingly formalized
and regulated institutional structure for the state administration of the class struggle"); Katherine
Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509, 1517 (1981)
(arguing that industrial pluralism in labor law "serves as a vehicle for the manipulation of employee
discontent and for the legitimation of existing inequalities of power in the workplace"); cf Klare,
supra, at 267 ("[S]ince World War II, organized labor has become more integrated into the economic
system of advanced capitalism, progressively more dependent on its erstwhile corporate adversaries,
and largely conventional in the political arena."). See generally CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE




sonhood and promote an inferior conception of human flourishing. 164 She
then notes the problem posed by the double bind, observing that prohibiting
the sale of kidneys may harm people even more. 165 For example, she fears
that prohibiting a parent from selling a kidney to finance surgery needed for
a child will only worsen the parent's plight (as well as the child's). 166
Although Radin acknowledges that this dilemma implicates a broader
systemic issue, she provides no guidance for dealing with it. She remarks
that situations in which all available choices are inconsistent with preserving
personhood show the need for more general social change.' 67 In other
words, there is clearly something wrong with a society in which people feel
compelled to sell their kidneys. Radin, however, fails to provide any gui-
dance for determining what we should do to move toward a more ideal soci-
ety. Given that our goal is social change, should we ban or permit kidney
sales?
Radin candidly recognizes that she has no answer, remarking, "Obvi-
ously, I have no handy algorithm for making this decision.' 1 68 Yet such an
"algorithm"-or rather, theory-is indispensable to any adequate under-
standing of personhood. A response to the double bind that does not at-
tempt to relate the particular nonideal solution to a broader effort at social
transformation will most likely amount to no more than tinkering or stabi-
lizing reform.
Reasons for the tendency. Radin clearly is aware of the need for a sys-
tematic critique.169 Thus, her failure to provide one is particularly striking.
Evidently, something in her approach consistently renders elusive the for-
mulation of such a critique.
To some extent, Radin's failure to offer any theory of transformative so-
cial change may relate to her assumption that the normative questions can
be bracketed; as noted, a theory that assumes away conflict over our deepest
values downplays any need or possibility for change and thereby helps to
entrench the status quo. However, a deeper explanation of the omission may
lie in Radin's conception of state power, which implicitly overstates the pas-
sivity of individuals.
For the most part, Radin does not portray people seeking, individually or
collectively, to transform their lives or society. Rather than focusing on
transformative efforts as the key agents of social change, Radin concentrates
164. See Radin, Market Domain, supra note 9, at 169-70.
165. Id. at 169.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 169-70.
168. Id. at 188; see also note 16 supra. Indeed, it is not clear she wants to have an algorithm in
all cases. See Margaret Jane Radin, Rent Control and Incomplete Commodification: A Rejoinder, 17
PHIL & PUB. Asu. 80, 83 (1988) (referring to her method as "relatively particularist and
nonalgorithmic"); note 3 supra.
169. See, eg., Radin, Market Domain, supra note 9, at 187 ("If neither commodification nor
noncommodification can put to rest our disquiet about harm to personhood in conjunction with
certain specific kinds of transactions.., then we must rethink the larger social context in which this
dilemma is embedded. We must think about wealth and power redistribution.").
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almost exclusively on the promulgation and implementation of legal rules to
respect personhood. That focus ultimately is unilluminating.
Consider again Radin's discussion of rent control. If, as noted earlier,
there is little basis for deeming rent control statutes an effective social recog-
nition of personhood, 170 it does not necessarily follow that they are useless;
it only means that the utility of rent control must be described in a context
that Radin's analysis fails to address, namely the long history of tenant or-
ganizing. 171 For example, neighborhood activists and legal services lawyers
have declared "eviction free zones," using the warranty of habitability and
other legal means to resist gentrification. 172 In addition, movements for rent
control have empowered tenants by bringing them together to work on an
issue of immediate concern, thereby building a base of support for a variety
of other progressive reforms. 173 Although housing problems cannot be fully
addressed at a local level, the forging of a community of people "'reborn' in
a socially conscious and collective manner"' 174 produces a real benefit, build-
ing "self-respect and fighting spirit,"' 175 facilitating the creation of coalitions
with other activist groups, and awakening people to the need for broader
systemic change.176
These efforts change individuals' personhood and, to some extent, create
a new collective personhood as well. These efforts do not constitute a social
170. See notes 158-161 supra and accompanying text.
171. See ALLAN DAVID HEsKIN, TENANTS AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: IDEOLOGY AND
THE TENANT MOVEMNTI 3-37 (1983).
172. See Lawrence K. Kolodney, Eviction Free Zones: The Economics of Legal Bricolage in the
Fight Against Displacement, 18 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 507, 514-20 (1991); see also id at 543 ("Be-
cause gentrification is a process that occurs within a neighborhood, and not just a force imposed from
without, neighborhood residents have the ability to alter the course of that process and take some
measure of control over their environment.").
173. As two commentators have stated:
When tenants organize for better housing conditions, they learn that simply protesting is
not enough to meet their needs. They find that they must involve themselves directly in the
electoral system if they wish to see long-term change. A valuable lesson results: Ordinary
people, working collectively, can affect (sic] significant change in terms of gaining greater
control over the conditions of their lives.... [W]inning one reform can spark demands for
even more fundamental changes.
GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 159, at 148 (citations omitted); see id. at 144-48 (discuss-
ing a successful tenant movement to adopt rent control laws in Santa Monica, California).
174. Tony Schuman, The Agony and the Equity: Strategies for Building Low-Income Housing,
in DILEMMAS OF ACTIVISM: CLASS, COMMUNITY, AND THE POLITICS OF LOCAL MOBILIZATION
240, 245 (Joseph M. Kling & Prudence S. Posner eds., 1990).
175. Id at 253.
176. As Schuman has noted:
Despite its shortcomings, self-help [in building low-income housing] is a currently neces-
sary activity and a useful training ground for local activists. Participants are brought into
direct confrontation with market forces and financing schemes. In this sense, it is precisely
because self-help does not "work" as a solution that it has potential. The self-respect and
fighting spirit of the self-help housers, coupled with their manifest commitment to preserv-
ing their neighborhoods, inevitably leads them to defend their physical and emotional in-
vestment. As they come to grips with the high cost of housing operation, they are obliged
to consider various cost-reducing strategies, including mortgage and tax default. They are




recognition of personhood interests, with all the passivity that such a charac-
terization implies, but rather a collective forging of personhood. While the
new personhood that emerges will not be perfect, or free of its own divisions,
its creation is a prerequisite to an effective overall solution to any social
problem.
In short, by focusing on how the law may already recognize personhood,
Radin shows a relative lack of interest in the question of how rent control
statutes come to be enacted. She comes closest to acknowledging the polit-
ical character of landlord-tenant law when she notes that "the issue of keep-
ing one's home can be seen as inextricably intertwined with the issue of
developing and protecting one's political voice."177 She still presents a pic-
ture, however, of a disembodied law bestowing the preconditions for com-
munity on a group of tenants who would simply be "unable to form strong
political communities" 178 but for the beneficent intervention of the law.179
2. Commodification in work and personal life.
Although the tendency to treat people as passive beneficiaries of the law
is evident throughout Radin's analysis, her treatment of commodification
most clearly displays this tendency. In essence, Radin equates commodifica-
tion with the existence of a market in which goods and services are bought
and sold.180 More precisely, she identifies commodification with the legal
rules that govern market activity: We are commodified if we are permitted
177. Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property, supra note 3, at 1694.
178. Id One example Radin offers is the retaliatory eviction defense:
The retaliatory eviction defense.., is rooted in the understanding that if tenants are to be
empowered to complain to the authorities about violations of their legal rights, and more-
over if they are to be able to organize to enhance their legal status, then loss of their homes
as a result of attempted political participation of this kind must be prevented
Id. (emphasis added).
179. By way of contrast to Radin's approach, consider the work of one theorist of community
action who seeks to point "the politics of homeownership" in a progressive direction by "decom-
modifying" property. JOHN EMMEUS DAVIS, CONTESTED GROUND: COLLECTIVE ACTION AND
THE URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD 322 (1991); see also id at 317-18 (footnotes omitted):
[C]ommunity organizing and neighborhood planning can strengthen institutions, practices,
and rituals that reproduce, within the "cultural terrain" of residential neighborhoods, not
the ideologies of capitalist accumulation, but oppositional ideas of property and place....
Counted among these "counter-hegemonic elements" are ideas of domestic property that
elevate accommodation over accumulation: ideas (and models) that treat housing as a
social good instead of a speculative commodity, ideas (and practices) that treat housing as
a human right instead of a precarious privilege.
Included, as well, among the "counter-hegemonic elements" of the homeplace are
those nonmarket sentiments, practices, and attachments that bind person to person, and
person to place.
At one level, Davis' similarity to Radin is remarkable; even his distinction between "accommo-
dative" interests in residential property ("security, amenity, and autonomy") and "accumulative"
interests ("equity, liquidity, and legacy"), see id. at 45, calls to mind Radin's distinction between
personal and fungible property. However, the central aim of Davis' work is to describe strategies for
the building of local organizations and a concomitant development of consciousness, in large part
through conflicts over housing issues. In no sense does he assume that decommodification Will ever
take place simply because the state removes housing (wholly or in part) from the market.
180. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1875 (referring to "alienability" as "the
heart of capitalist property relationships").
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to sell ourselves or some aspect of ourselves; we are decommodified if we are
not permitted to engage in such sales; and we are partially decommodified if
such sales are permitted to a limited extent (for example, if they are neither
criminalized nor given contractual enforcement).
While commodification has something to do with market transfers, it is a
mistake to equate commodification with the legality of such transfers. First,
a focus on legal rules is unlikely to devote adequate attention to the many
ways in which people are commodified independently of the direct power of
the law. Second, equating commodification with the legal rules governing
market transfers wrongly ignores the possibility of resistance to power, un-
dermining from the outset any effort to look beyond particular issues to
broader social change.
A more systemic analysis is possible if we adopt a more comprehensive
framework for understanding commodification as a pervasive force in our
working lives, as well as in our personal lives. In our working lives, capital-
ist society is, in a sense, "anti-personhood" because laborers are denied the
opportunity to fulfill their self-actuating potential. Contrary to Radin's sug-
gestion, however, legal rules giving employers title to the product of work-
ers' labors and market forces requiring sellers to meet a market price do not
impose commodification and alienation on workers. Rather, commodifica-
tion and alienation result from employers' success in taking control of the
labor process by fragmenting and de-skilling labor. The degradation of work
has been complemented in our personal lives by the rise of a consumer cul-
ture that encourages people to pursue development and self-realization not
through work but through the purchase of goods. This culture has reached
a point where many consumers come close to defining themselves in terms of
the styles and imagery associated with those goods.
An analysis of commodification in these terms has two advantages over
Radin's approach. First, when we view commodification as a system, we can
grasp more clearly the extent to which commodification already pervades
society, apart from the legality of market transfers. 181 The second advan-
tage, paradoxically, is that this analysis indicates that the commodifying ten-
dency of society, while more pervasive than Radin allows, is not as
irresistible as implied by her equation of commodification with the legaliza-
tion of market transfers.
Commodification as a system of work and consumption. One way to un-
derstand what is lacking in Radin's conception of commodification is to
scrutinize her discussion of what she calls the Marxian criticism that "under
capitalism property itself is anti-personhood." 182 She describes the critique
181. As a result, we can understand why Radin's concern that sex would become commodified
if prostitution were legalized has an air of irrelevance: Sex is already pervasively commodified in our
culture.
182. Radin, Personhood, supra note 16, at 970. Roberto Unger has argued that "capitalism"
has virtually no explanatory force as a concept; because of the rich historical variations among
societies loosely deemed capitalist, every attempt to define the term ends up being either severely
overinclusive or underinclusive. See UNGER, supra note 12, at 101-13. Indeed, William Lazonick's
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of the alienation of labor as follows: "Marx portrayed workers' alienation
from their own human self-activity as the result of producing objects that
became market commodities. By objectifying the labor of the worker, com-
modities create object-bondage and alienate workers from the natural world
in and with which they should constitute themselves by creative interac-
tion."18 3 Describing fetishism-"a kind of projection of power and action
onto commodities"I 84-she continues:
Relationships between people are disguised as relationships between com-
modities, which appear to be governed by abstract market forces. I do not
decide what objects to produce, rather "the market" does. Unless there is a
demand for paperweights, they will have no market value, and I cannot pro-
duce them for sale. Moreover, I do not decide what price to sell them for,
"the market" does. At market equilibrium, I cannot charge more nor less
than my opportunity costs of production without going out of business. In
disequilibrium, my price and profit are still set by "the market"; my price
depends upon how many of us are supplying paperweights in relation to
how many people want to buy them and what they are willing to pay for
them.185
Radin's exclusive emphasis on market conduct is misplaced. In Marx's
scheme, the treatment of labor power as a commodity to be bought and sold
is merely a precondition of alienation. Workers are never, in fact, commodi-
ties. Once hired, they must be made to work. The hiring of a laborer is thus
the opening of a struggle in which the employer continually tries to wrest
effective control of the labor process from the workers.18 6 The extent of
commodification depends upon how successful the employer is in this
endeavor.
insightful work in comparative economic history shows that the form of work organization I de-
scribe in this section is far more characteristic of the American economy than of either the British or
Japanese economies. See WILLIAM LAZONICK, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE ON THE SHOP FLOOR
299-331 (1990). Nothing in Radin's analysis or in my critique of it, however, turns on the assertion
that capitalism has some essential characteristic: What is important is the character of work (both
blue-collar and white-collar) in our society.
183. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1871.
184. Id. at 1872.
185. Id. at 1873.
186. In Marxian terms, this struggle arises from the fact that workers sell their "labor
power"-their capacity to work-but employers thereby gain rights to the workers' "labor effort."
William Lazonick explains the process as follows:
But, Marx asked, if all commodities exchange at their values, what is the source of the
surplus value out of which are paid interest, rent, and profits to financiers, landlords, and
industrial capitalists? He located the answer in the special position of labor power as a
commodity when it enters the capitalist production process. The capitalist gets access to
the productive capabilities (labor power) of workers for a wage that will command the
amount of labor time socially necessary to reproduce the worker. But labor power is not
the same as labor effort. One represents the productive capability of the worker, while the
other connotes the actual utilization of that capability in the production process.
The capitalist can try to influence two quantitative dimensions of labor effort: the
duration and intensity of work. The first involves lengthening the hours of work, while the
second involves increasing the speed of work.
WILLIAM LAZONICK, BusINEss ORGANIZATION AND THE MYTH OF THE MARKET ECONOMY 119
(1991). For a good discussion of the limits of Marx's approach, see id. at 120-22.
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In the twentieth century, management has attempted to gain control
over the labor process by the continual "Taylorization" or degradation of
work.18 7 Through this process, work has become increasingly de-skilled,
that is, broken down into repetitive and controllable units. The separation of
conception and execution has had a number of consequences, one of which is
that for many, work offers fewer and fewer opportunities for creativity. 188
It would be wrong, however, to focus exclusively on work in discussing
commodification. One aspect that Marx neither discussed nor anticipated is
the concomitant rise of a consumer culture. An appreciation of the signifi-
cance of this development is crucial to understanding what "commodifica-
tion" means in our society. The rise of consumer culture has brought
commodification into our personal lives, compounding the effect that
Taylorization has wrought in the work place.
A major feature of the development of capitalism in the twentieth cen-
tury has been the promotion of a tendency to look to leisure and consump-
tion for the meaning and self-fulfillment missing from de-skilled work.18 9 In
part, the phenomenon is simply the counterpart to alienation at work. It is
therefore wrong to view family life as a previously pristine arena of love and
warmth untouched by market relations, because it was created by the same
system that gave us the market. Work was taken out of the home, and the
home was left to be a refuge-a Belmont to Venice.1 90 The consequent ideal
187. See HARRY BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL: THE DEGRADATION OF
WORK IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1974). On Taylorization, see generally DAN CLAWSON,
BUREAUCRACY AND THE LABOR PROCESS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF U.S. INDUSTRY, 1860-1920
(1980); RICHARD EDWARDS, CONTESTED TERRAIN: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WORKPLACE
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1979). See also SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, IN THE AGE OF THE SMART
MACHINE: THE FUTURE OF WORK AND POWER 41-46 (1988) (describing Taylorization and "the
purification of effort"). For an evaluation of the role of Taylorism in production in the post-World
War II era, see Andrew Glyn, Alan Hughes, Alain Lipietz & Ajit Singh, The Rise and Fall of the
Golden Age, in THE GOLDEN AGE OF CAPITALISM: REINTERPRETING THE POSTWAR EXPERIENCE
39, 55-56 (Stephen A. Marglin & Juliet B. Schor eds., 1990).
188. See BRAVERMAN, supra note 187, at 113, 124-28; cf. I KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRI-
TIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 361 (Frederick Engels ed. & Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling
trans., International Pub. 1967) ("The knowledge, the judgment, and the will, which, though in ever
so small a degree, are practised by the independent peasant or handicraftsman.... are now required
only for the workshop as a whole.... What is lost by the detail labourers, is concentrated in the
capital that employs them.").
Thus, it is inaccurate to say that Marx conceived of alienation per se as "the heart of capitalist
property relationships"; it is not merely the fact that the worker must sell his labor power that is key,
but that in doing so the stage is set for a contest between capital and labor for control of the work
process.
189. See, eg., Raymond Benton, Jr., Work, Consumption, and the Joyless Consumer, in PHILO-
SOPHICAL AND RADICAL THOUGHT IN MARKETING 235, 245 (A. Fuat Firat, Nikhilesh Dholakia &
Richard P. Bagozzi eds., 1987) (attempting to explain how the pursuit of greater economic activity
may actually lead to consumer dissatisfaction and restlessness). One might trace the rise of leisure to
the nineteenth century. See generally DANIEL T. RODGERS, THE WORK ETHIC IN INDUSTRIAL
AMERICA, 1850-1920 (1974). In any event, consumer culture is a historically specific phenomenon
and is not endemic to the human condition.
190. Cf Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv.
561, 622 (1983) ("In Venice people make contracts; in Belmont they exchange wedding rings."); id
at 623 ("Each is at once the other's partner and its enemy.").
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of the home, moreover, was a gendered one, intimately bound up with wo-
men's role as wife and homemaker and men's role as provider.
The effort to create a mass consumer market has also left its mark on the
search for self-fulfillment. The most distinctive feature of this effort is adver-
tising, in which goods, typically in highly gendered forms, are marketed to
give the impression of control, status, and mastery.191 The imagery associ-
ated with cars provides a good example of this phenomenon. More gener-
ally, consumer culture is directed at persuading us to seek individually, in
the consumption of goods, solutions to social flls. 192 Consequently, the con-
struction of consumer culture can be understood as a way of enmeshing our-
selves in the status quo: Instead of looking to the public sphere and to
collective action to remedy social ills, we look to consumption and to per-
sonal regimens to give meaning to our lives.193
The significance of consumer culture may also implicate our very under-
standing of ourselves. In his insightful analysis, Stuart Ewen speaks of an
emerging conception of the "self as other," marked by an emphasis on as-
sembling a self from commodities and the meanings they symbolize.194
Ewen refers to the historical emergence of "style" as a key principle of con-
sumer culture; style, he argues, is "understood as a tool for constructing
personhood."' 195 Embodiment in the home provides an example of Ewen's
point: Embodiment may mean buying a collection of Ralph Lauren home
furnishings ("furniture, bedding, towels, fabrics and rugs") built around
Lauren's "vision of the Safari concept."1 96 Investment in that concept is an
economical choice for busy selves, for Lauren supplies not only furnishings
but a "lifestyle and attitude."1 97 The shopping mall-the ubiquitous coun-
terpart to the suburban home-provides another example of Ewen's argu-
ment. The mall is not simply an agglomeration of stores, but a carefully
planned environment designed to create a total experience by which we are
expected to define ourselves as consumers.1 98
191. See EWEN, supra note 100, at 215-17.
192. See Schnably, supra note 99, at 860 ("For example, if the urban environment was un-
healthy or unsafe, the solution was not collective action to improve living conditions, but the
purchase of a health or beauty aid or the installation of a better lock on one's door."); cf EWEN,
supra note 100, at 103 (noting that "purchasable objects are invested with the connotation of
subjectivity").
193. See EwEN, supra note 100, at 103.
194. Id. at 76.
195. Id. at 79. Ewen continues: "Style... [is] a way of saying who one... [is], or who one
wishe[s] to be. The emerging market in stylized goods [has] provided consumers with a vast palette
of symbolic meanings, to be selected and juxtaposed in the assembling of a public self." Id. This
conception of style came to fruition with the advent of the American department store, and its
successor, the shopping mall.
196. WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY, Apr. 7, 1989, at 9.
197. I d; see also Patricia Leigh Brown, Lauren's Wink at the Wild Side, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,
1990, at Cl, C6 ("Mr. Lauren's lush products for the home [are] 'no risk' items that 'take away the
need for decision-making for a lot of people.' ") (quoting Professor George Leib of the Fashion
Institute of Technology).
198. The rise of the mall was an integral part of the development of consumer culture. Con-
comitant with the rise of mass advertising in the early part of the twentieth century, retailers began
to be concerned with providing something more than goods:
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The attractiveness of assembling an identity this way presupposes the
experience of lack of control and creativity associated with the Taylorization
of work: "The assembling of a commodity self, this 'dream of wholeness,'
implies a sense of partialness and fragmentation that resides just beneath the
surface. The appeal of style in twentieth-century cultures cannot be sepa-
rated from the conditions of the human subject it addresses." 199 The under-
standing, community, and control that people lose at the workplace are
recovered in the meanings that advertising attributes to the consumption of
goods.200
In sum, consumer culture represents the insinuation of a more detailed
form of power into people's lives and self-conceptions. We create ourselves
from a palette of alternatives presented to us, encouraged to believe that we
are pursuing individual development and fulfillment through buying goods,
while failing to do anything about the experience of work that has denied us
satisfaction in the first place.20 1 The emphasis that consumer culture places
on the pursuit of private, individual solutions, rather than on collective
change, cultivates a certain passivity in the people under its sway.20 2
The redesign of store facades and interiors focused attention on the pervasive field of
action available to the intelligent seller, on the lure of well-displayed objects and their
aesthetic properties. Buying was now more than merely a survey of luxurious objects; it
was a total experience in which the retailer became a subtle adviser on personal taste, a
joiner who fit individual temperament with proper merchandise.
Neil Harris, The Drama of Consumer Desire, in CULTURAL EXCURSION: MARKETING APPETITES
AND CULTURAL TASTES IN MODERN AMERICA 174, 184-85 (1990). Similarly, shopping mall own-
ers today want nothing to interfere with the "cocooning" of their patrons. See William Glaberson,
Swaddling Shoppers A Mall's Cocoon Effect, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1992, at AI0.
199. EwEN, supra note 100, at 79. Ewen describes style as follows:
In the marketing of style, in its images, surfaces, and scents, the dream of identity is
paraded before our eye's mind. It is not only a dream of public identity, but it also plumbs
the wells of inner identity. Style, in its images and objects, offers a provocative typology of
needs, a symbolic politics of transcendence. In this sense, style provides people with a
powerful means of expression.
Id. at 106. For a fuller account, see Stuart Ewen, Advertising and the Development of Consumer
Society, in CULTURAL POLrrICs IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 82 (Ian Angus & Sut Jhally eds.,
1989); see also NICHOLAS XENOS, SCARCITY AND MODERNITY 100-08 (1989) (describing a "con-
sumption code of the upper-middle-class lifestyle" that seems to pervade the New York Times).
200. See Sut Jhally, Advertising as Religion: The Dialectic of Technology and Magic, in CUL-
TURAL POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA, supra note 199, at 217, 221-22.
201. For example, Lears explains how consumer culture affects our views of our bodies:
Clearly, there are some ways in which we probably are more at home in our bodies than
our great-grandparents were. But the symbolic universe of advertising is less concerned
with solitary pleasures than social relations in private and public. And the persistence of
the motif of control down to the present, in ads for everything from hair spray to com-
puters, suggests the continuation of the patterns described here. As the public world
outside the self becomes diffuse, distant, governed by institutions we cannot control or even
influence, the body remains important as an arena we actually can control--or think we
can. It becomes a domain of self-expression, a field for developing one's own set of cultural
meanings, and a source, quite naturally, of anxiety.
TJ. Jackson Lears, American Advertising and the Reconstruction of the Body, 1880-1930, in FITNESS
IN AMERICAN CULTURE: IMAGES OF HEALTH, SPORT, AND THE BODY, 1830-1940, at 47, 62
(Kathryn Grover ed., 1989).
202. Even apologists for consumer culture can be surprisingly explicit about the passivity and
lack of knowledge that underlie it. See e.g., ROBERT B. SETTLE & PAMELA L. ALRECK, WHY
THEY Buy: AMERICAN CONSUMERS INSIDE AND OUT 280-81 (1986) (applauding advertisement for
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Thus, Radin's focus on the permissibility of buying and selling goods
leads us astray in our understanding of commodification. First, Radin un-
derstates the pervasiveness of commodification in work. The fact that the
fruits of production are for sale is not the only source of commodification. A
more significant source is a process of production that systematically strips
people of any semblance of control, creativity, and self-fulfillment in work.
This means that work is still commodified in a key sense even when there are
limits on the market transfer of labor; indeed, the complete ban of labor
markets (as in the Soviet model) does not entirely decommodify work.20 3
Second, Radin's emphasis on the role of market transfers causes her to
underestimate the extent of commodification of women and their domestic
role. Currently, Radin states, the "homemaker services of a wife" are
"noncommodified," by which she means that such services are "nonmarke-
tized" (i.e., rendered without the payment of money).2° 4 However, the crea-
tion of the family as a private refuge, with women relegated to the home, was
an integral part of the degradation of work and the corresponding rise of
consumer culture.205 Women's unpaid domestic labor is thus commodified
in its origin. It is also commodified in its relationship to consumer culture.
Homemaker services are performed with the aid of commodities, and home-
makers are frequently the targeted audience for advertising promoting those
commodities. 20 6 In short, although it is not bought and sold, women's un-
paid domestic labor is deeply entrenched in the entire system of commodity
production.
Finally, the focus on market transfers misleads us concerning the extent
of commodification of the body and sexuality. Radin's observation that a
full-fledged, open market in sexual services would change our conception of
sexuality is true to some extent. But, by asking what would happen if sex
were "fully and openly commodified," we see most starkly the danger of an
implicit (and inadvertent) approval of the status quo. Asking that question
virtually invites us to overlook an important fact: Even if sex is not fully
commodified (and never could be), our present society makes a good try at
it.
Consumer culture profoundly affects the way we conceive of our bodies
beer directed at young, mostly male consumers ("emulators"): "One's brand of beer has essentially
nothing to do with one's academic or professional life, but emulators won't know that!").
203. Similarly, it is not the simple fact that workers do not have title to the product of their
labors that renders attainment of a healthy personhood problematic. Vesting title in the workers
through employee stock ownership plans ("ESOPs"), for example, would have little bearing on the
question of alienation, because ESOPs do not give workers control over management decisions-let
alone do anything to break down the separation between conception and execution that necessitates
a separate management function in the first place. See, eg., Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker
Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J.
1749, 1797-1800 (1990).
204. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1923 n.260.
205. See Schnably, supra note 99, at 769-71.
206. See id at 859-60; see also WRIGHr, supra note 101, at 208 (discussing reinforcement of
gender roles by advertising); Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, Efficiency and Image: Advertising
as an Antitrust Issue, 1990 DUKE L.J. 321, 359-63 (also discussing gender-reinforcing advertising).
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and sexuality. Although we tend to think of our bodies as quintessentially
personal, self-image becomes enmeshed in the larger system of commodifica-
tion. This happens not because we buy and sell our bodies, but because we
come to view them in the same terms of display and competition that we
apply to the goods and services through which we are constantly invited to
recreate ourselves.20 7
With sexuality already "spread. .. like butter on all . .. [consumer]
products, ' 20 8 it could not be much more commodified. The most important
factor promoting the commodification of sexuality is not the extent to which
sexual services are bought and sold through prostitution, but the way in
which the whole system of consumer culture defines our very conception of
ourselves and our sexuality. A focus on legal rules diverts our attention
from what is most central to the process of commodification.
In sum, in a system of consumer culture, all commodities have implica-
tions for personhood: The category of "fungible" property is an empty
one.20 9 The whole system of commodities-the kind of personhood it pro-
motes and the ways that it can be resisted-must be considered. In that
207, For example, conceptions of a desirable body have changed over time from corpulence as
a symbol of success to a thinner, more "abstract" ideal. EwEN, supra note 100, at 178; see JOAN
JACOBS BRUMBERG, FASTING GIRLS: THE EMERGENCE OF ANOREXIA NERVOSA AS A MODERN
DISEASE 258-71 (1988); Susan Bordo, Reading the Slender Body, in BODY/POLITICS: WOMEN AND
THE DISCOURSES OF SCIENCE 83 (Mary Jacobus, Evelyn Fox Keller & Sally Shuttleworth eds.,
1990). As Ewen notes, the ideals of the consumer culture and "middle-class bodily rhetoric of the
1980s" together "mark a culture in which self-absorbed careerism, conspicuous consumption, and a
conception of self as an object of competitive display have fused to become the preponderant symbols
of achievement." EwEN, supra, at 194.
Michel Foucault provides insight into how conceptions form. He writes of disciplines or re-
gimes that are comparable to the modem practices that form our conceptions of the body. As Ewen
notes:
In the routinization of labor, in the rote teaching of schoolchildren, in the measured strides
of fashion models, even in the detailed positional instructions of exercise tapes or sex
manuals, Foucault's "well-trained regiments" can be heard marching in the distance.
Against this historical panorama, the monitored, regulated and segmented body ideal
goes against its own claims for itself. On the aesthetic plane of the commercial culture this
bodily motif suggests self-motivated, individual power. But its historic roots and its
method of construction ("bodybuilding") reveal a person who is, to quote Foucault, the
"object and target of power." In their aestheticization, the modem structures of power are
turned on their heads, posed as symbols of afree individuaL In the world of style, where
images seem to float, disconnected from the world that produces them, mastery can be
confused with obedience.
EWEN, supra, at 196 (footnote omitted) (citing MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE
BIRTH OF THE PRISON 136 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977)). For a useful discussion of Foucault's
theories of power, discourses, and disciplines, see Christopher Tilley & Michel Foucault, Towards an
Archaeology of Archaeology, in READING MATERIAL CULTURE: STRUCTURALISM, HERMENEUTICS
AND POST-STRUCTURALISM 281 (Christopher Tilley ed., 1990).
208. STEPHEN HEATH, THE SEXUAL Fix 149 (1982).
209. Radin thinks otherwise. See note 50 supra and accompanying text. Under a more sys-
tematic approach, however, even the status of things like nuts and bolts as commodities is nowhere
near as unproblematic as Radin indicates. Radin anticipates this objection, for she goes on to say:
To this the universal noncommodifier would no doubt respond that commodified nuts
and bolts are produced by commodifled labor, and that prohibiting commodified labor
morally matters as much as prohibiting commodified love, friendship, and sexuality. She
might further respond that commodification of their labor forces workers to experience
only the commodifled versions of love, friendship, and sexuality.
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consideration, the legal rules governing market transfer may or may not be
important, but they should not be our central focus. We could, in other
words, absolutely forbid the sale of body parts, and in the most important
sense still have a commodified conception of ourselves.
Resistance to commodification. Although commodification is more per-
vasive than Radin allows, it is a tendency, not an overwhelming force.
Workers have constantly opposed commodification, collectively and individ-
ually. Throughout the twentieth century, they have managed to assert some
degree of control over the actual processes of work; the successes of unions,
however eroded over the last two decades, show that workers have not been
transformed into passive objects of power.210 Moreover, as macroeconomic
policy has come to be viewed as the state's responsibility, economic and in-
vestment decisions have become matters for political dispute and thus open
to contest on another level.211 For these reasons, and only these reasons,
work has not been fully dehumanized.
Similarly, consumer culture is not an irresistible juggernaut. First, it is
constantly undermined by its contradictory nature. The same degradation
Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1912 n.231.
I would agree that it is significant that the nuts and bolts have been produced by commodifled
labor. If Radin means, however, that the harm to the laborers results because they do not set the
price of the nuts and bolts, or because they have to worry about the demand for them, then her
argument misses the point. I would also agree that prohibiting commodified labor matters as much
as prohibiting other forms of commodification. As I have argued, however, Radin does not provide
an adequate account of why that is so.
Finally, I would agree that the commodification of labor is part of a system that fosters and
promotes "commodified versions of love, friendship, and sexuality." I object, however, to the notion
that it forces anyone to experience them as such. Such a view assumes away the possibility of resist-
ance, thus inadvertently glorifying power.
210. See CLAWSON, supra note 187, at 33 ("Workers' activities were not derivative from what
capital did: they fundamentally shaped what happened. Indeed, what capital did (specifically in-
cluding Taylorism and the rise of bureaucracy) is hardly comprehensible except as a response to
workers' success in resisting previous capitalist attempts at control."); ZUBOFF, supra note 187, at
31-36 ("The protective response of so many workers to the demands made on their bodies is... the
source of many work procedures that have been formalized and institutionalized in labor contracts
and work rules."); cf Michael Burawoy, Terrains of Contest Factory and State under Capitalism and
Socialism, SOCIALIsT REV. July-Aug. 1981, at 83, 90-93 (discussing "psychological and other
processes through which subordination to capital is secured, the processes through which workers
come to comply with and often advance their own dehumanization").
211. See EDWARDS, supra note 187, at 209-13; Schnably, supra note 99, at 868-70. In men-
tioning this resistance and struggle, I do not seek to evaluate the strength of the forces at play, or
their future prospects. If there is a tendency for economic issues to become politicized, and thus
potentially subject to democratic control, there are also powerful counter-trends. One such trend is
the glorification of the market as a mechanism that functions best without government interfer-
ence-an ideology that undermines the prospect of democratic control of the economy. Indeed, with
the demise of the Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union, the market, largely free from government
control, is hailed as a necessary aspect of democracy. See, eg., Glenn Frankel, 30 Nations Launch
Bank to Aid Eastern Europe: Lending to Promote Switch to Free Market, WASH. POsT, Apr. 16, 1991,
at Dl. Behind the phrase "free-market democracy" lies the substantive assertion that the market
and democracy go hand in hand. See, eg., William E. Schmidt, West Sets Up Store and the Russians
Are Seduced, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1991, at A4; Craig R. Whitney, Gorbachev Asks British Leader
for Economic Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1991, at A5. Another counter-trend is the increasingly
undemocratic character of political life itself, see Schnably, supra note 31, at 877-78, so that subject-
ing the economy to greater government control does little to promote democratic governance of the
economy.
[Vol. 45:347
January 1993] PROPERTY AND PRAGMATISM
of labor at the workplace that gives the personal sphere of consumption
much of its allure has also helped undermine people's economic ability to
participate in consumer culture. Many people simply do not have the finan-
cial means to find satisfaction or style through purchasing goods, or-with
family incomes stagnating since the 1970s-they find it increasingly difficult
to do so. 212 Frustrated expectations can be powerful catalysts for question-
ing and resistance.
Furthermore, struggles against racism and sexism almost inevitably en-
tail some questioning of consumer culture. Indeed, much that is emblematic
of consumer culture is riven with racism and sexism. For example, blacks
often are excluded in advertising, 2 13 and African-Americans of all income
classes face widespread discrimination in shopping. 214 In addition, advertis-
ing often degrades women, or reinforces gender roles by depicting women as
responsible for the health and welfare of home life.21 5 People's resistance to
these forces constitute part of a larger effort to contain and control the ef-
fects of consumer culture.
Given these contradictory social trends, people can be as intractable as
consumers as they have been as workers by retaining some capacity to strike
a critical stance toward consumer culture. Resistance can take the form of
myriad individual acts.216 For example, although influential, advertising
212. See BENETT HARRISON & BARRY BLUESTONE, THE GREAT U-TuRN: CORPORATE RE-
STRUCTURING AND THE POLARIZING OF AMERICA 109-38 (1988); ANDREW J. WINNICK, TOWARD
Two SOCIETIES: THE CHANGING DISTRIBUTIONS OF INCOME AND WEALTH SINCE 1960, at 203-12
(1989); Wallace C. Peterson, The Silent Depression, CHALLENGE, July-Aug. 1991, at 29; Donald L.
Barlett & James B. Steele, Lost in America: The Middle Class Rules Change to Favor Rich, MIAMI
HERALD, Nov. 17, 1991, at IA; Peter T. Kilborn, Unions at a Loss to Reverse Falling Fortunes of
Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1991, at Al.
213. Cf. Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995 (2d Cir.) (suit charging the New York
Times with racial bias for using virtually no black models in its housing advertising), cert denied,
112 S. Ct. 81 (1991).
214. See, eg., Ayres, supra note 116, at 817; Lena Williams, When Blacks Shop, Bias Often
Accompanies Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1991, at Al; see also ANDREASEN, supra note 116, at 59-
103, 151-77 (describing African-American consumers and their problems, as well as price discrimi-
nation in inner cities).
215. See DIANE BARTHEL, PUTrING ON APPEARANCES: GENDER AND ADVERTISING (1988);
ALICE E. COURTNEY & THOMAS W. WHIPPLE, SEX STEREOTYPING IN ADVERTISING 3-30 (1983);
Carol M. Tucker, Distortions in Advertising: The Tivialization ofAmerican Women, 10 Soc. ACTION
& L. 12 (1984).
At the same time, the very effort to meet the new (and often costly) ideals proposed by con-
sumer culture has been one factor drawing women into the workplace. Because of women's identifi-
cation with the personal sphere, though, anything that seems to draw them into market relations can
be seen as posing a special threat to the possibility of intimacy and personal development with which
the family has become identified. That, in turn, has helped fuel the whole set of debates over gender
roles. The conservative response is to reinforce the division between the market and the family-for
example, by discouraging women, whose traditional role as wife and mother is seen as crucial to the
family, from entering the labor force. This response overlooks the fact that the market system itself
constantly undermines that division.
216. See, eg., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 46 (1991) (re-
counting that after being excluded from a store on account of her race, the author "typed up... the
story .... made a big poster of it, put a nice colorful border around it, and, after Benetton's was
truly closed, stuck it to their big sweater-filled window"); Isabel Wilkerson, Black Neighborhood
Faces White World With Bitterness, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1992, at Al, A12 (describing how one
man "stood silently... after a white cashier put his nickels and quarters on the counter," and then
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may be met with skepticism. 217 In addition, one cannot assume that the
mass media impose a single reality upon people; to some extent, audiences
actively create their own meanings, which can amount to a form of resist-
ance.218 Finally, resistance can manifest itself in a demand for goods and
services not produced by our society: collective goods, like day care, for
example, or a clean environment.219
In contrast, although Radin's analysis of the self under universal com-
modification as a collection of severable aspects rather than an integrated,
contextualized whole220 bears some resemblance to Ewen's, it inadequately
addresses the possibility of resistance. At first glance, Radin's discussion of
commodification of the body appears to go beyond the legal rules that gov-
ern purchase and sale in the market. However, she consistently returns to
that definition of commodification.
Consider Radin's analysis of prostitution. In asking what would happen
if "sex were fully and openly commodified" by legalizing prostitution, 221 Ra-
din implicitly assumes that a complete commodification of sexuality would
be possible. She asserts that if we fully permitted the sale of women's sexual
services, a "change would occur in everyone's discourse about sex, and in
particular about women's sexuality. '222 According to Radin, an open mar-
ket in sexuality would lead us to value sexuality only as something to be
told the cashier to "give me my money in my hand like I gave it to you"); Williams, supra note 214,
at A14 (describing one woman's practice of allowing clerks who have treated her suspiciously be-
cause she is black to run her credit card number for approval, after which she "tell[s] them to tear up
the sales and credit slips, give[s] them a lecture on racial prejudice, then walk[s] out the door leaving
them holding pieces of paper").
217. For an interesting exploration of a consumer-oriented critique of advertising, see Peter
Grahame, Criticalness, Pragmatics, and Everyday Life: Consumer Literacy as Critical Practice in
CRITICAL THEORY AND PUBLIC LIFE 147 (John Forester ed., 1985).
218. See Ien Ang, The Nature of the Audience, in QUESTIONING THE MEDIA: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 155 (John Downing, Ali Mohammadi & Annabelle Sreberny-Mohamnadi eds.,
1990); Lana Rakow, Feminist Perspectives on Popular Culture, in QUESTIONING THE MEDIA: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION, supra, at 231. Similarly, when people go to shopping malls they do not
necessarily engage in the experience the owner has in mind. John Fiske attempts a "postmodern"
understanding of resistance to consumer culture in shopping malls through "guerrilla" tactics, rang-
ing from teenagers "hanging out" at the mall with no intention of buying anything, to shoplifting.
JOHN FISKE, UNDERSTANDING POPULAR CULTURE 37-39 (1989). The extent to which these tactics
have any effect on the system is a more difficult question, but it at least alerts us to the potential for
resistance.
219. Of course, these demands are not inherently destabilizing. As public facilities like play-
grounds are displaced by privatized ones (at least for middle-class families), see, e.g., Elizabeth
Rudulph, Old-Fashioned Play for Pay, TIME, Nov. 4, 1991, at 86, or as formerly private functions
like childcare are taken over by corporations, there is potential for the capitalist system to "rational-
ize" still other areas of life. The day-care chain Kinder-Care, for example, provides standardized
day care for what it calls its "units" (children), see Russell Watson, What Price Day Care?, NEWS-
WEEK, Sept. 10, 1984, at 14, while paying low wages to its "teachers," Myron Magnet, What Mass-
Produced Child Care Is Producing, FORTUNE, Nov. 28, 1983, at 157, 158. Kinder-Care justly earns
frequent comparisons with McDonald's and Kentucky Fried Chicken. See, eg., Dean Foust,
Kinder-Care May Stick to Its Sitting, Bus. WEEK, July 13, 1987, at 36; Magnet, supra, at 158. There
is, however, no a priori reason to suppose that people's demands can always be deflected from some-
thing potentially transformative.
220. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1905.




bought and sold.223 Perhaps most strikingly, Radin asserts that if a court
were to uphold contracts for prostitution, commodification would be "offi-
cially imposed." 224 She bases this assertion solely on the fact of judicial en-
forcement without explaining the nexus between legal rules and people's self-
understanding. She never analyzes the inability of the law to impose corn-
modification (or decommodification), as evidenced by the existence of a
black market for sexual services. Nor does she explain why the intimate
sharing of sexuality she takes as the ideal would disappear under a legal
regime permitting a market in sexual services.
Radin's analysis of surrogacy similarly equates commodification with the
extent to which legal rules permit or prohibit sale of women's "womb serv-
ices. "225 She argues that if women were permitted to sell their gestational
capacities, they would be even more commodified than if prostitution were
permitted. All their attributes-not just their sexuality-would be treated as
commodities: "There is certainly the danger that women's attributes, such
as height, eye color, race, intelligence, and athletic ability, will be mone-
tized.... This monetization commodifies women more broadly than merely
with respect to their sexual services or reproductive capacity. '226 Indeed,
children would also be commodified. 227 Moreover, damage remedies for
breach of surrogacy contracts would amount to officially imposed com-
modification in precisely the same way as would damages for breach of pros-
titution contracts. 228
To prevent commodification through surrogacy, Radin asserts, society
should prohibit sales of gestational services.2 29 An alternative would be to
permit incomplete commodification, in which sales are permitted but women
are allowed to change their minds.230 After considering the problems of the
double bind, Radin offers a tempered endorsement of market-inalienability
223. Id. ("It might make the ideal of nonmonetized sharing impossible."). Radin suggests that
"the best way to characterize the present situation is to say that women's sexuality is incompletely
commodified." Id. at 1923. That conclusion is premised on the fact that prostitution is incompletely
permitted by the law-i.e., it is largely (though not universally) outlawed on the books, but in prac-
tice is tolerated, at least insofar as men are concerned. Ia at 1921 n.256 ("Legalized prostitution has
existed in many places, and there has always been a large black market of which everyone is well
aware. That those who purchase prostitutes' services are often not prosecuted seems to indicate that
commodification of sexuality, at least by the purchasers, is tolerated."). Examples of near-prostitu-
tion, such as topless bars, are also relevant to the analysis. See, e.g., Nick Ravo, Topless Clubs For a
Crowd In Pin Stripes, N.Y. TImsS, Apr. 15, 1992, at Cl, C12 (noting that, at Stringfellows, in New
York City, a topless "dancer" will strip at a customer's table, or within "touching distance of a
customer," for a higher fee).
224. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1924 n.261.
225. Id at 1929.
226. Id. at 1932.
227. Id. at 1933; cf id. at 1926 (permitting adoption market would commodify babies' personal
attributes and might "destroy personhood as we know it").
228. See id at 1935 n.294.
229. Id at 1932-33. Giving away those services would be permitted: Market-inalienability is
what Radin addresses. See id
230. Id at 1934.
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over incomplete commodification. 231
For all its richness and insight, Radin's analysis effectively treats people
as passive and unresisting objects of power. It discounts the possibility that
women who had to pay damages for breaching prostitution contracts232
might react with outrage, rather than experience themselves as totally com-
modified. Similarly, the more generalized problem Radin sees with fully le-
galizing prostitution-an inexorable "change . .. in everyone's discourse
about sex"-is vastly overstated. The fact that women have sought to pres-
sure advertisers into eliminating sexist stereotyping and have attempted to
ban pornography (or at least challenge the perception of it as harmless)
shows that women can resist the kind of change that Radin foresees.233 Sim-
ilarly, her assumption that permitting surrogacy arrangements would result
in commodification ignores women's capacity to fight the sexist and objecti-
fying tendencies of paid surrogacy. Individual women, for example, have
fought to retain children they have borne under surrogacy contracts, and
feminist groups have sought to limit or ban the practice.234
Of course, I do not claim that the possibility of resistance to commodifi-
cation would ever justify enforcing contracts for prostitution or surrogacy.
Nor do I assert that resistance to commodification will always succeed. My
claim is simply that we effectively write out the very possibility of resistance
if we focus exclusively on legal rules. The abortion issue illustrates this
point. Although anti-abortion statutes clearly are oppressive to women, a
full discussion of these statutes and understanding of their meaning for wo-
men requires more than that simple observation: We cannot overlook the
fact that women, individually and collectively, have always resisted these
laws. 235
Radin's failure to account for people's capacity for resistance and initia-
tive is significant in part because it renders her analysis inaccurate. By por-
traying people as the passive beneficiaries of state protection of personhood
interests or as the defenseless victims of legal regimes that disrespect per-
sonhood, Radin's model leaves no room for personal and collective struggle.
231. See id. at 1936 ("In my view, a form of market-inalienability similar to our regime for
ordinary adoption will probably be the better nonideal solution.").
232. One might wonder who would ever bring such a cause of action, but if a legalized prosti-
tution industry arose, one could well imagine that courts would be asked to resolve various disputes
involving a woman's contractual duty to complete the transaction.
233. For examples and discussions of programs of feminist resistance, see generally ANDREA
DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981); SUSAN GRIFFIN, PORNOGRAPHY
AND SILENCE: CULTURE'S REVENGE AGAINST NATURE (1981); MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY
OF THE STATE, supra note 134; Caryn Jacobs, Patterns of Violence: A Feminist Perspective on the
Regulation of Pornography, 7 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 5 (1984); Sunstein, supra note 134; Eric Hoff-
man, Comment, Feminism, Pornography, and Law, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1985); William K.
Layman, Note, Violent Pornography and the Obscenity Doctrine: The Road Not Taken, 75 GEO. L.J.
1475 (1987).
234. Consequently, resistance to commodification can take the form of lobbying for laws out-
lawing the purchase and sale of human beings or their attributes. My point is not that such laws are
necessarily irrelevant, but that it is wrong to focus exclusively on them and to ignore their prove-
nance in collective struggles against commodification.
235. See Schnably, supra note 31, at 907.
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Thus, Radin's view that labor law and rent control statutes represent
recognitions of personhood seems disembodied, removed from a history of
conflict and strife, and distant from the current ambiguities of co-option and
transformation that still mark them.23 6
Perhaps more significantly, Radin's identification of commodification
with purchase and sale suggests that the main response to commodification
is to disempower people-to change legal rules to strip people of the power,
in whole or in part, to make market transfers of the commodified property or
aspect. Even when the disempowerment is not as obvious as a ban on sales,
the solution to commodification is state intervention in the name of protec-
tion, as in labor legislation or landlord-tenant law. However, when we focus
instead on struggle and conflict, we see that power is potentially more perva-
sive than Radin recognizes, and yet more capable of being resisted. This
approach would shed light on a variety of issues.
3. The second heuristic.
The second heuristic indicates that the tensions in apparent consensus
that the first heuristic uncovers as a matter of theory are brought into the
open as a matter of fact by actual struggle and conflict. As noted earlier, the
first heuristic helps us understand how policies implemented in the name of
a seemingly consensual norm actually may worsen social problems. Because
any relationship to property is socially mediated, every act of self-assertion
concerning property has the potential to escalate into a broader challenge to
policies underlying property rules. The second heuristic bids us to scrutinize
the political agendas that might make such escalation more likely. As the
following discussion of homeless and bodily commodification issues demon-
strates, the second heuristic moves legal theorizing away from a conception
of people as the passive objects of state power.
How might the law come to protect personhood interests on the part of
the homeless? It might grant protection to people who develop a homelike
relationship to a particular piece of property. A homeless person, for exam-
ple, might develop an attachment to a particular library where she passes her
time. Or perhaps several homeless people would develop a stake in an aban-
doned apartment building they took over and repaired. By upholding the
right of the homeless person to use the library even when others object to her
hygiene, and by permitting squatters to occupy the building they have taken
over, the law would be protecting personhood interests.
However, by overlooking the socially mediated nature of any relation to
property, an account like this one ignores the activism that might help pro-
duce legal recognition of the interest in the first place. While an individual's
desire to spend time in a particular library may at first blush seem a matter
of purely individual personhood, it is in fact no more an individual battle
than was a sitdown protest at a segregated lunch counter in the 1960s a
conflict between the personhood of the white proprietor and that of the indi-
236. See notes 158-168 supra and accompanying text.
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vidual protesters. Just as the system of white supremacy demanded that Af-
rican-Americans accept an inferior place in society, so too the system of
inadequate housing and employment we maintain demands that the home-
less not intrude too obviously or blatantly into others' lives. Thus, the pres-
ence of the homeless in a public library has the potential to escalate into a
challenge to the entire system of exclusion and invisibility, just as any defi-
ance of Jim Crow laws constituted a potential challenge to the whole system
of segregation. 237
No legal theory could definitively describe the occasion when such es-
calations might occur, but a theory could alert us to that potential by point-
ing out the ways in which contests over property and conmodification issues
represent efforts to forge a new personhood. Attempts by groups of home-
less persons and advocates to occupy vacant buildings provide a good exam-
ple. Squatters' campaigns may temporarily provide individuals with shelter.
But that plainly is not the only or even the central aim of such campaigns.
The organizers of virtually every squatter movement make clear that their
aim is to draw attention to the existence of unused buildings at a time when
some people have no homes.238 As with tenants' campaigns for rent control
and other related housing campaigns initiated by local activists, a key aim is
mobilizing protest and informing the public, which could help build the ba-
237. Examining Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964), which concerned a challenge to the
prosecution for trespass of African-Americans who had remained at a lunch counter to protest segre-
gation, Radin sees a "standoff" in personhood terms, because the lunch counter "proprietor could
argue that she had her personhood bound up with being able to exclude blacks, while the blacks
could argue that their personhood is bound up with being served." Radin, Personhood, supra note
16, at l011. Describing the protesters' aim as "being served," as if they merely wanted lunch, is a
remarkably bland way of characterizing the protesters' interest. On the contrary, their interest lay in
resisting and undermining the system of legally sanctioned racism that attempted to cast them as
inferior human beings. Was not one goal of the civil rights movement to transform the proprietor?
Equally important, by portraying the conflict at issue in Bell as a standoff later resolved only by
governmental intervention, Radin implicitly depicts the African-American protesters as dis-
empowered-ironically, at the moment of their courageous self-assertion. Of course, the civil rights
movement did not produce merely a standoff that needed to be resolved only by the intervention of
the law. Rather, the protesters' direct collective action forced the elites that dominated the federal
government to step in and end de jure segregation. See, eg., STEWART BURNS, SOCIAL MOVE-
MENTS OF THE 1960s: SEARCHING FOR DEMOCRACY 155 (1990) ("Massive, sustained protest, al-
most entirely nonviolent, compelled the government to act."); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HoLLow HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 39-169 (1991) (arguing that the
civil rights movement, international pressure, economic changes, and related factors had far more
effect in ending segregation than did the courts).
238. Similarly, the members of the Community for Creative Non-Violence who asserted a First
Amendment right to sleep in Lafayette Park across from the White House (an assertion rejected by
the Supreme Court in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984)) did so
not because they intended to create a homestead in the park, but to underscore the plight of the
homeless. See id. at 291-92, 296; see also Stone v. Agnuos, 960 F.2d 893, 894, 895 (9th Cir. 1992)
(noting that homeless individual who claimed First Amendment right to sleep in San Francisco's
Civic Center Plaza considered himself a "spokesman for homeless persons," and argued that his
action "'dramatized' the plight of the homeless"). Likewise, the "Mad Housers" who built wooden
huts for the homeless may have had as one aim forcing the city of Chicago to focus attention on the
inadequacy of shelters and the lack of housing. See Don Terry, Homeless Prefer Huts to Chicago's
Public Housing, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1992, at 7. The main effect of building the huts (which the
city decided to remove) appears to have been to force the city to find apartments for some of the
homeless who had moved into them.
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sis for effective social action on the problem of homelessness. 23 9
We ignore this relationship at great cost. As Lucie White has pointed
out, "the movement to end 'homelessness' has brought groups such as
churches, mental health professionals, and even the construction industry,
into coalition among themselves, on behalf of a passive and vulnerable image
of the poor.''24° Although it produced some important successes in the short
run, this disempowering strategy also represented a missed opportunity to
attempt to mobilize coalitions among the poor, leaving the homeless vulnera-
ble to a backlash.24 1 Radin's approach can be understood as the theoretical
expression of the political strategy that White describes. Under this ap-
proach, the homeless' defiance, as well as their self-development through
self-empowerment (individual and collective), however localized and seem-
ingly mundane, vanishes as the homeless are transformed into passive benefi-
ciaries of state protection.2 42
Applying the second heuristic to Radin's analysis of commodification of
the body is particularly revealing, for that analysis is, in an important re-
spect, markedly different from her analysis of other issues pertaining to
property and personhood. Radin's analysis here shows a real awareness that
societal circumstances help create the needs and perceived interests that give
239. It follows from this line of analysis that the first heuristic by itself is inadequate. Earlier, I
posed the question whether "we" want the homeless to have homes. See text accompanying note
143 supra. The real question, though, ought to be whether the homeless want to have homes. This
question can be posed in different contexts. On an individual basis, the answer of many homeless
people might be "yes." If my analysis of the ideal of the home is correct, however, collective, em-
powering action could well lead many homeless people and their allies to question aspects of that
ideal. What good would a home in the suburbs be if there are no jobs nearby and inadequate public
transportation to reach them? In other words, just as tenant organizing for rent control and related
measures can lead to the forging of a community of people "'reborn' in a socially conscious and
collective manner," Schuman, supra note 174, at 245, so too might efforts to organize rather than
merely protect the homeless result in a transformation of their conception of the ideal.
240. White, supra note 108, at 292; see id. at 291-94.
241. See id. at 295-96:
The concept skewed social policy away from the broad crisis in housing affordability, with-
out providing substantial relief for those most desperately in need. It reinforced a long
tradition in our culture of categorizing the poor, not in order to target social programs to
those with the greatest need, but rather, in order to blame poor people for their own desti-
tution. And although "homelessness" sensationalized the shelter crisis, it may have also
helped numb the public to an overwhelming problem.
242. Through such means, "interpretive violence" is inflicted on the very subjects of our con-
cern, not intentionally but by "the subtle ways that our own images and concepts of poverty cut
against our intentions." Id. at 312. The phenomenon I describe here seemingly is the academic's
equivalent of the poverty lawyer's practices that Anthony Alfieri analyzes so incisively. See
Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100
YALE L.J. 2107, 2128-29 (1991) (analyzing "subordination" as one form of "interpretive violence,"
by which "the lawyer objectifies... [the] image [of client dependency and inferiority], transmuting
the client into an object, a thing to be handled, manipulated, and remolded"). These practices lead
poverty lawyers unintentionally to overlook clients' own accounts of their struggles, exclude them
from important strategic decisions, and enforce obedience to the lawyer's "pre-understanding" of
client helplessness and dependence. See id. at 2123-25. To counter the interpretive violence of the
poverty lawyer, Alfieri proposes several reconstructive practices. Id. at 2131-45. To the extent one
can draw parallels between the practice of poverty lawyers and that of academics, the heuristic




rise to many of the problems relating to commodification of the body. Why,
for example, would a woman agree to serve as a surrogate mother? As Ra-
din points out, the surrogate's motivation cannot be understood simply as a
desire to help others, for the effects of existing power structures must be
accounted for. There is, Radin notes, a problem of "ironic self-deception.
Acting in ways that current gender ideology characterizes as empowering
might actually be disempowering. Surrogates may feel they are fulfilling
their womanhood by producing a baby for someone else, although they may
actually be reinforcing oppressive gender roles. ' 24 3 Surrogacy may also re-
inforce racial inequalities to the extent that its practice reflects an attempt to
alleviate a "shortage" of adoptable white babies.244
Furthermore, decisions to sell one's organs-or one's baby, for that mat-
ter-cannot be understood apart from their social context. As Radin herself
recognizes, only people denied basic material needs would seek to sell one of
their kidneys.245 One might add that the demand for kidney transplants
would not be so high if we had an adequate system of health care delivery
capable of preventing problems like high blood pressure that lead to kidney
failure.246
Thus, Radin's nonideal evaluation of commodification carefully exam-
ines the socially-mediated nature of the decision to sell one's body or sexual
or gestational services, 247 lending her discussion its richness, and avoiding a
presentation of people, individually and collectively, as passive objects of
state power. If, for example, the alternatives appear to be either to starve or
243. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1930.
244. Cf Tamar Frankel & Francis H. Miller, The Inapplicability of Market Theory to Adop-
tions, 67 B.U. L. REv. 99, 99 (1987) (noting that "most couples want healthy, white infants, and
those children are in short supply"); Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions,
67 B.U. L. REV. 59, 65 (1987) ("There is no shortage of nonwhite and of handicapped infants, and of
any children who are no longer infants, available for adoption. Such children are substitutes for
healthy white infants, and the higher the price of the latter, the greater will be the demand for the
former.").
Similarly, why would a woman become a prostitute? Any understanding of this decision as a
purely individual career choice would be nonsensical. The decision has far more to do with existing
structures of class and gender that expose many women to sexual violence from an early age and
deny them meaningful opportunities for self-assertion and economic independence. See Evelina
Giobbe, Confronting the Liberal Lies About Prostitution, in ATTACK ON FEMINISM, supra note 121,
at 67; Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1916, 1922.
245. Radin, Market Domain, supra note 9, at 169, 181-82, 187-88.
246. See Max Michael III, Slouching Toward Chaos: American Health Policy and the Home-
less, in SAFETY NET, supra note 151, at 44, 45-52 (discussing problems of health care delivery to the
poor in the United States).
As with so many American social problems, racism plays a role. See CHARLES J. DOUGHERTY,
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE: REALITIES, RIGHTS, AND REFORMS 14 (1988) (arguing that many ur-
ban blacks are unable to obtain long-term follow-up care for chronic health problems, which may
"help to explain the much higher rate of kidney failure due to uncontrolled hypertension among
blacks").
To some extent, the shortage of body organs also reflects racism. See Paul Delaney, Fighting
Myths in a Bid to Get Blacks to Consider Transplants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1991, at C17 (noting
hesitancy by some African-Americans to donate organs based on fears that white doctors will refuse
to use donated organs for blacks, or will prematurely declare black patients dead to obtain organs for
white transplantees).
247. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1921-36.
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to sell one's kidney, then as Radin recognizes, there is an element of choice
in an individual's decision to mutilate her body in exchange for money, as
well as an element of condescension in the characterization of such a deci-
sion as coerced. 248 Radin also recognizes to some extent the active role that
society takes in constructing personhood.249
Unfortunately, Radin eviscerates the potential implicit in her limited rec-
ognition of individual and collective activism by persisting in her emphasis
on consensus,2 50 evidenced in her constant references to what "we" might do
about prostitution, surrogacy, and organ sales in light of the basic values she
assumes we share.251 I do not necessarily object to the use of the word "we";
nor do I claim that Radin is unaware of the complexities that underlie it.252
What is needed, however, is a much fuller exploration of the different polit-
ical programs that might emerge from contests over what we should do, and
how those different programs might relate to the social constitution of
personhood.
Consider Radin's rejection of the prophylactic argument that supports
the prohibition of sales of body parts, children, sex, or gestational services.
As noted, she partly grounds her objection on the double bind that would be
created by prohibition of such sales: Forbidding them does nothing to allevi-
ate the poverty that might motivate people to sell personal things in the first
place.2 3 Radin concludes that "this aspect of liberal prophylactic pluralism
is hypocritical without a large-scale redistribution of wealth and power that
seems highly improbable." 254
Radin's rejection of the prophylactic argument implicitly assumes that
we could ever effortlessly decide to permit such sales in the first place,255 as
if markets for these goods and services somehow would arise naturally, and
society's involvement would be limited to intervention after the fact. This
assumption, however, is patently untrue. Even if the rise of flourishing mar-
kets in body parts, sex, or surrogacy did not require a prior legal definition of
248. See Radin, Market Domain, supra note 9, at 169 (characterizing the argument for banning
kidney sales because poverty coerces poor people into the sales as "cruelly smug"); id. at 182 ("It
seems to add insult to injury to ban desperate exchanges by deeming them coerced by terrible cir-
cumstances, without changing the circumstances.").
249. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1921-36; id. at 1881-87 (regarding con-
stitutive effect of rhetoric on personhood).
250. See notes 141-157 supra and accompanying text.
251. See Radin, Market Domain, supra note 9, at 165; Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note
9, at 1921-36.
252. See Radin, Pragmatist, supra note 7, at 1711 ("What leads some pragmatists into compla-
cency and over-respect for the status quo is partly the failure to ask, Who is 'we'?... [Tihe mistake
[of failing to be critical about what 'we' refers to] is tempting for a pragmatist whose perspective is
that of a member of the dominant group, because from that perspective it seems 'the' perspective.").
253. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1910-11.
254. Id. at 1911.
255. The analysis that follows concerns Radin's rejection of the prophylactic argument. Her
ultimate position on the various issues related to commodification of the body turns on more than
this single question. As I have already noted, however, Radin's other arguments also rest on the
same underlying assumption of political passivity. See notes 221-236 supra and accompanying text.
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rights and responsibilities, 256 there is little doubt that any serious prospect of
such markets would generate substantial controversy.25 7 In that event, what
sort of political programs might emerge? It is hard to imagine poor people
mobilizingfor the right to sell their body parts.2 58 No group of poor people
acting collectively would be likely to believe that gaining such a right would
do anything to lessen their poverty. More likely the poor would move to ban
organ sales and demand government action to help alleviate the economic
deprivation that leads to contemplation of such desperate measures. Such
efforts would require lobbying, at the very least, and possibly even grassroots
organizing and coalition-building. Only from these efforts might we begin to
see some prospect for the kind of "large-scale redistribution of wealth and
power" that would be needed to ease the dilemma of the double bind.
To be sure, people can and should argue about particular political judg-
ments concerning strategies for social change. My claim regarding grass-
roots organizing in favor of organ sales is only a prediction of what is likely
to take place, not an absolute prescription. What is crucial, however, is that
we at least think about those political judgments. To put it another way,
when Radin states that we should not ban organ sales because it will do
nothing to alleviate poverty, she is not being concrete and pragmatic,
notwithstanding her assessment. Like those whom she rightly criticizes for
simply asserting that such sales are coerced, Radin here betrays a rarified
conception of politics, one which assumes that significant political decisions
can be made without at least some struggle or conflict. To be truly prag-
matic and concrete, we should determine what sorts of political coalitions
could be mobilized to address the problem of poverty that gives rise to the
issue of organ sales in the first place. 259 Only by focusing on this question
256. Cf Michael L. Connell, Why not a market for human organs?, MIAMi HERALD, Mar. 29,
1992, at IC (advocating legal recognition and facilitation of market transfers of body organs).
257. Undoubtedly, many people would disapprove of the existence of such a market. Cf Na-
tional Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, § 301, 98 Stat. 2339, 2346-47 (1984), amended by
Health Omnibus Programs Extension of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-607, § 407, 102 Stat. 3048, 3116
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1988)) (banning organ purchases for transplantation). Prostitution
and baby-selling also are generally prohibited (with some exceptions regarding prostitution). See
Freeman, supra note 10, at 77-79. Surrogacy has met with a mixed reception. See, eg., R. Alta
Charo, Legislative Approaches to Surrogate Motherhood, in SuRROGAT MOTHERHOOD: POLMrriCS
AND PRIVACY 88 (Larry Gostin ed., 1990). New York recently enacted a statute making surrogacy
contracts void and prohibiting brokers' fees for surrogacy. Act of July 17, 1992, ch. 308, 1992 N.Y.
Laws 1005.
258. The same observation could be made about baby-selling and prostitution. Granted, there
have been some "prostitutes' rights" groups, but, except perhaps in pointing out the dangers prosti-
tutes face and the hypocrisy of enforcement patterns, their impact and following have been negligi-
ble. Cf Jim Nesbitt, Sex with Street Prostitutes Deadly Gamble with AIDS, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 2,
1992, at A4 (noting lobbying of prostitution rights advocates for legalization and regulation of
prostitution).
259. Moreover, the most concrete change that could result would not be the formal institu-
tional approval of certain words on paper-that is, the issuance of a judicial opinion or the passage
of a statute-but the bolstering of collective efforts to change society.
While the question of organ sales is not the most politically pressing issue of our times, organ
sales will never simply be "permitted"; there undoubtedly would be significant conflict if proponents
of organ sales attempted to change the provision in the U.S. Code banning such sales. See note 257
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can a theory of personhood avoid the tendency to drift.260
In contrast to organ sales, surrogacy and prostitution are issues that
might inspire widespread political organizing. Here, too, a more concrete
and practical focus would require us to think about the conflicting social
visions that account for different political responses to surrogacy and prosti-
tution,2 61 for these issues form an arena in which people attempt to consti-
tute gender roles and the family in different ways.
These differences in perspective have disparate implications for some of
the double bind and transition problems associated with debates over surro-
gacy and prostitution. For feminists concerned with dismantling structures
of gender inequality, the possibility of "ironic self-deception" that Radin
highlights is a major danger of surrogacy. 262 Becoming a surrogate might
seem to represent the exercise of women's power to decide for themselves
what is most fulfilling, but surrogacy may at the same time reinforce the
oppressive conception that it is women's "essential nature" to be mothers
and homemakers. 263 It is also unclear whether surrogacy would provide
economic gain for poor women or simply constitute a new form of exploita-
tion. In addition, feminists would be concerned that outlawing prostitution
can be seen as depriving women of a choice of a profession,2 " whereas per-
mitting it allows men to treat women purely as objects of sexual desire.
Looking at these same issues from a traditionalist perspective, however,
we see a very different set of concerns. A major goal from this perspective
would be the preservation of traditional gender roles and family structures.
The traditionalists' concern over prostitution is obvious: They disapprove of
prostitution because it represents a separation of sexuality from marriage
and family. Their concern about surrogacy would be that allowing women
to bargain over reproduction might undermine their roles as wives and
mothers.
The differing goals of feminists and traditionalists point to correspond-
ingly different political programs for dealing with surrogacy and prostitu-
tion. For feminist groups, any political program dealing with these issues
must include mobilization for broader reforms like comparable worth, abor-
tion rights, and adequate day care, all of which would help free women from
the constraints imposed by gender role norms. But as we have seen in recent
years, women can also mobilize around curtailment or destruction of abor-
supra. In that context, the question becomes, concretely and practically, how people concerned
about poverty might best expend their political energies to do something about it.
260. See notes 166-168 supra and accompanying text.
261. See notes 112-122 supra and accompanying text.
262. See text accompanying note 243 supra.
263. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1929-30; cf. Alessandra Stanley,
Marilyn Quayle Says the 1960"s Had a Flip Side, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1992, at A10 (quoting speech
given by Marilyn Quayle at the Republican National Convention) ("[Miost women do not wish to be
liberated from their essential natures as women.").
264. See Freeman, supra note 10, at 83-85 (relating arguments of some prostitutes' rights
groups for legalizing prostitution).
January 1993]
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
tion rights and support for a version of the traditional family. 2 6 5
Each of these programs would help forge a very different political con-
sciousness-and create a very different personhood-for many women. For
example, the more that women achieved substantive equality, the less con-
cern feminists might have that permitting women to choose surrogacy would
entangle them in "ironic self-deception." On the other hand, the more that
the traditionalist program succeeded, the more reason we would have to be-
lieve that a woman choosing surrogacy would do so precisely as an instantia-
tion of traditional gender role norms. In both cases, the legal regime would
be the same-"commodification" would be permitted. In both cases, the
double bind would be less troubling, though for very different reasons. But
the meaning of surrogacy for most women could hardly be more different: a
rejection of confinement to traditional roles in the one case, and confirma-
tion of women's "essential nature" in the other.
It is obvious, then, not only that people struggle to constitute per-
sonhood, but that they do so with very different visions in mind. We must
choose between them, but that choice can only be made in the actual con-
tests for power that make up social and political life. By posing the question
in terms of what legal rules concerning commodification an apolitical "we"
should adopt, Radin overlooks the painful but potentially liberating insight
that we are as divided as we are united on fundamental issues; and it is but
one step beyond that oversight to a theoretical approach that erases the con-
flicting self-assertions that constitute politics.
IV. CONCLUSION
As I noted in the Introduction, one can view Radin's attempt to develop
a pragmatic approach to the law as both an effort to find some moderate
ground between formalism and full acceptance of the indeterminacy critique,
and as a response to the turn away from grand theory. I have argued that,
for all their depth and critical acumen, Radin's efforts display an implicit
conservative bias. It would be wise to ask whether this bias is a feature of
pragmatism itself.
One possible answer is that pragmatism must tend to be conservative
because it looks to existing social context and practices as a source of mean-
ing for words and rules, giving it an inherent bias toward the status quo. But
this answer seems unconvincing for the simple reason that conflict character-
izes our basic values as much as consensus; resistance to the status quo is as
much a part of social practice as is support for it. There seems to be no
intrinsic reason why a focus on social context and practices should produce a
bias toward the existing social order.
We might, then, attribute the implicit conservatism in Radin's work not
265. I do not mean to argue that only conservative women support such programs. My point
is simply that women have been active in these controversies, and not all of them in support of
feminist causes. See generally CELESTE MICHELLE CONDIT, DECODING ABORTION RHETORIC:
COMMUNICATING SOCIAL CHANGE (1990).
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to pragmatism as such but to a failure to be thoroughly pragmatic. A strik-
ing feature of Radin's work is the different treatment she accords human
flourishing and nonideal evaluation. Her analysis is relatively pragmatic
with respect to transition problems and double binds, in the sense that it is
characterized by a close analysis of their social context. But her approach
seems decidedly unpragmatic as well. Radin is as abstract as one could pos-
sibly be in her broad assertions of deeply embedded values like personal em-
bodiment in the home that, in her view, constitute the ideal of human
flourishing. This abstractness brings Radin very close in practice to using
the "power-free language" that she has recognized to be illusory.266 Ironi-
cally, she maintains a high level of abstraction in spite of her asserted com-
mitment to deal with immanent social values rather than some transcendent
theory of what is right or good.2 67
Radin also betrays a lack of pragmatism in her failure to deal with con-
flict and struggle. Notwithstanding her commitment to resolving the sub-
ject-object dichotomy in the realm of values, Radin, like many other legal
theorists, often treats people like objects devoid of any capacity to partici-
pate in a struggle-however unfair, and unequal it may be-to determine
their own fates. 268 This tendency can be thought of as a failure of pragma-
tism: Close attention to social context, to the innumerable and detailed ways
in which people interact, should bring to the forefront people's efforts to
determine their own fates.
These shortcomings may result from a tendency to underestimate the
need for theoretical and descriptive ambition. As noted earlier, significant
elements of the legal academy have increasingly turned away from an ab-
stract or all-encompassing grand theory. Much can be said for that develop-
ment, particularly insofar as it reflects a decision to focus on the concrete
situations of people's lives. But as Steven Smith has suggested in his analysis
of pragmatism, there is one respect in which we need greater theoretical
ambition, not less. Legal pragmatism can too easily fall into a vacuous
neutrality:
The underlying instinct-one that avoids making difficult and controversial
substantive judgments upon fundamental human questions-seems very
much the same [as the quest for neutrality]. After all, what could be safer
and less likely to give offense than a legal philosophy that principally offers
innocuous advice such as "Respect human experience," "Listen to all
sides," and "Be sensitive to context?" 269
Radin's insight and theoretical activity certainly raise her work far above
266. See Radin & Miechelman, Critical Legal Practic, supra note 7, at 1027.
267. See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
268. See Schnably, supra note 31, at 861.
269. Smith, supra note 1, at 448; see also David Luban, Legal Traditionalism, 43 STAN. L.
REv. 1035, 1040, 1060 (1991) (noting a "backlash against philosophy, and more generally against
'fancy theory,"' but arguing that the backlash fits uncomfortably well with irrationalism); Steven
Walt, Some Problems of Pragmatic Jurisprudence, 70 TEx. L. Rv. 317, 324 (1991) (reviewing Pos-
NER, supra note 12) (arguing that "a pragmatic jurisprudence is banal: either its injunctions are
components of any plausible jurisprudential theory or its injunctions are uninformative").
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such banality, but it nonetheless manifests a conspicuous tendency to invoke
consensus and intuitive norms, drawing back from "difficult and controver-
sial substantive judgments upon fundamental human questions." My criti-
cism is not, I should add, that Radin fails to resolve these questions but that
her approach consistently obscures rather than highlights them.
Radin's tendency to overlook conflict may be understood somewhat
through an examination of her more jurisprudentially oriented work. As
noted, Radin's desire to preserve the possibility of the rule of law leads her to
search for areas of agreement and consensus that can be used as a basis for
imposing rules upon people. Although this effort yields some benefits, it
does not warrant the blunting of critical awareness that it appears to entail.
How might we avoid this shortcoming? Two approaches merit some
consideration. First, we might abandon the notion of the rule of law itself.
Radin rejects this approach because she finds the rule of law crucial to her
judgment of who we are as a society: "We will still find it deeply norma-
tively appealing to conceive of ourselves as a people governed by its law
rather than by arbitrary individual power, because conceiving of ourselves
this way I take to be constitutive of ourselves as a political community. '270
To some extent this view begs the question of whether we consciously ought
to work toward some other self-definition; indeed, Radin herself hints at this
possibility, suggesting that her own allegiance, at least to the phrase "the
rule of law," is not unqualified.271 Still, rejecting the ideal of the rule of law
seems unrealistic and even misguided. Particularly at a time when Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet republics are attempting to free themselves
from a heritage of arbitrary rule, we might pause before we dismiss the
power of the ideal too quickly. 272
Instead, I would advocate another, seemingly more modest approach
that may also be the more powerful one in the long run: We should rethink
what it means to be an interpretive community. This approach allows us to
address directly the weaknesses in Radin's work. The first is a tendency to
focus too exclusively on legal rules.273 To the extent that Radin's approach
suggests that legal texts and judicial decisions are the focus of our collective
self-constitution, that focus is not only inaccurate but also potentially dis-
empowering.274 Christopher Tomlins' conclusion about the significance of
labor law could well be generalized: "[A] counterfeit liberty is the most that
270. Radin, Rule of Law, supra note 3, at 813.
271. Radin discusses the problems with the phrase:
Whether or not the term "the Rule of Law" should be dropped becomes another pragmatic
question, a matter of judgment about its ideological baggage. Is the term indelibly linked
in our usage with the ideas that law is instrumental and consists of pre-existing formal rules
applied in a value-free manner? Or can its precepts be reinterpreted in the way I have
begun to suggest?
Id. at 819.
272. Cf E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 267
(1975) ("[I]f the actuality of the law's operation in class-divided societies has, again and again, fallen
short of its own rhetoric of equity, yet the notion of the rule of law is itself an unqualified good.").
273. See notes 158-179 supra and accompanying text.
274. See notes 158-179 supra and accompanying text; Schnably, supra note 31, at 872-73.
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American workers and their organizations have been able to gain through
the state. Its reality they must create for themselves. '275
The second weakness is Radin's assumption that when we look to forms
of social life to give meaning to norms, "community" necessarily means con-
sensus, at least in some respects.276 At a high level of generality, the as-
sumption that there are some shared values may be right, but as a practical
matter, it is far easier to overestimate, rather than underestimate, the impor-
tance of that observation. I would readily concede that if we shared abso-
lutely nothing in common, communicative conflict and tension would be
impossible: We would simply be talking past each other. But the more in-
teresting focus of attention for legal scholars, at least now, may well be the
differing social visions that we bring to the disputes that divide our commu-
nities.277 Of course, one might ask what we hope to accomplish by a shift in
the focus of legal scholarship. My answer, admittedly incomplete, is that it
would at least illuminate the issues more fully, and counter what I believe is
a tendency on the part of much current legal theory to understate both the
extent to which people are oppressed by the law and the degree to which
they shape it through their struggles. Contest, discord, conflicting self-asser-
tion-these are what we ought to think of first when we talk about commu-
nity, even if they do not tell the whole story.
275. TOMLINS, supra note 163, at 328.
276. Radin argues that social life gives meaning to our Constitution and other premises:
The Constitution, for example, because it "constitutes" the polity, consists of more than
the words on the document. The words would be meaningless without everything else in
our moral/political culture that gives them their constitutive meaning. Some of the other
things that make the Constitution what it is can be other written texts, like the Declaration
of Independence, but some are unwritten basic premises of our moral and political world,
like the principle of one person, one vote. Our other important documents and our unwrit-
ten basic premises all take meaning from the way we understand (and continue to recon-
struct) the historical events surrounding the Founding and other salient points in our
history. Statutes, regulations, and other common-sense legal artifacts are not authoritative
in some way separable from their meaning, and their meaning is dependent on their entire
social context.
Radin, supra note 8, at 265.
277. With regard to abortion, for example, the indeterminacy critique of "pro-life" and "pro-
choice" arguments seems correct. That is, any argument about when human life begins, or about
what the scope of privacy should be, will prove fundamentally contradictory. See Schnably, supra
note 99, at 724-61, 782-816. In turn, those differing social visions are grounded in social and polit-
ical contests over the sort of personhood-as women and men-we will create as a society. Id. at
830-84. Precisely by looking to what most divides us on abortion, rather than looking to values we
allegedly share at some high level of generality, will we most shed light on the abortion issue.
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